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Abstract
A growing body of research shows that firms’ employment and wage-setting policies
contribute to wage inequality and pay disparities between groups. We measure the
effects of these policies on racial pay differences in Brazil. We find that nonwhites
are less likely to work at establishments that pay more to all race groups, a pattern
that explains about 20% of the white-nonwhite wage gap for both genders. The pay
premiums offered by different employers are also compressed for nonwhites relative to
whites, contributing another 5% of the overall gap. We then ask how much of the
under-representation of nonwhites at higher-paying workplaces is due to the selective
skill mix at these establishments. Using a counterfactual based on the observed skill
distribution at each establishment and the nonwhite shares in different skill groups in
the local labor market, we conclude that assortative matching accounts for about two-
thirds of the under-representation gap for both men and women. The remainder reflects
an unexplained preference for white workers at higher-paying establishments. The wage
losses associated with unexplained sorting and differential wage setting are largest for
nonwhites with the highest levels of general skills, suggesting that the allocative costs
of race-based preferences may be relatively large in Brazil.
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Race exerts a powerful influence on wage outcomes in many countries.1 Though
part of the earnings gap between different racial groups can sometimes be explained
by differences in education or other observed factors, unexplained pay disparities
are a major policy concern in the U.S., Brazil, and other nations. Most economic
research on race-related wage differentials builds on the approach of Becker (1957),
who assumed that each worker faces a market-determined wage.2 A growing body of
work on frictional labor markets, however, suggest that wages also incorporate firm-
specific pay differences that can contribute to pay disparities.3 When employers have
wage-setting power, the racial pay gap will depend in part on the extent to which
higher-paying firms differentially employ whites versus nonwhites – a between-firm
sorting effect – and in part on the relative size of the pay premiums offered by a
given firm to different race groups – a relative wage-setting effect.
Findings from three complementary strands of research suggest that these effects
may be important. Randomized audit studies in many countries show that employer
call-back rates for minority job applicants are lower than those for whites, implying
that some employers set a higher bar for nonwhite candidates, or avoid hiring minori-
ties altogether.4 Observational studies show that minority managers are more likely
to hire and retain minority applicants than their non-minority counterparts (e.g.,
Giuliano, Leonard, and Levine, 2009, 2011; Giuliano and Ransom, 2013; Aslund,
Hensvik, and Skans, 2014), pointing to potential discrimination by some managers.
And workplace-level studies of employee segregation show substantial segmentation
by race (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2008; Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney, 2008)
and ethnicity (e.g., Aslund and Skans, 2010; Glitz, 2014).
Nevertheless, it is unclear how much these patterns matter for white-nonwhite
1For overviews focusing on the U.S., see Altonji and Blank (1999), Fryer (2010), and Bayer and
Charles (2018). For a summary of race-based differences in Latin America, see Nopo (2012) and
Cano-Urbina and Maso (2016). For evidence on race differentials in the U.K. and Canada, see
Blackaby, Leslie, and Murphy (2002) and Pendakur and Pendakur (1998, 2002), respectively.
2See Charles and Guryan (2008, 2011) for recent analyses that build directly on Becker’s model,
and Hirata and Soares (2016) for an application in Brazil.
3See Manning (2011) for a review of frictional and imperfect competition models of the labor
market. Black (1995) presented an early search-based model of discriminatory hiring. Lang and
Lehmann (2012) present a review of the discrimination literature emphasizing frictional labor mar-
ket models. Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016) study the effects of firm-specific wage setting on
gender wage gaps in Portugal.
4Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016) summarize 36 studies in OECD countries: they find a median
call-back rate for minorities relative to whites of 0.67, which is very close to the rate estimated
in the seminal study by Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). A recent audit study focusing on job
openings for recent college graduates in Mexico City (Arceo-Gomez and Campos-Vasquez, 2014)
finds a similar pattern for indigenous-looking female applicants.
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earnings differences (see Lang and Lehmann, 2012, for a careful discussion). To
quantify the impacts, we use rich administrative data on the formal sector in Brazil
to estimate a series of two-way fixed effects (or “job ladder”) models for wages,
separately by race and gender, that include worker and establishment fixed effects.
We then use the estimated wage premiums for white and non-white workers at each
establishment, together with data on the distributions of workers across workplaces,
to conduct a series of decompositions that identify the contributions of between-firm
sorting and within-firm relative wage setting on racial pay gaps for each gender.
Racial differences in firm’s employment and wage-setting policies are particularly
relevant in our context. A steady stream of research since Silva (1978, 1980, 1985)
and Oliveira, Porcaro, and Arau´jo (1981) has shown that the unexplained wage gaps
between whites and nonwhites in Brazil are similar to those in the U.S., despite dif-
ferences in the historical background and legal setting.5 Several studies have shown
that the gaps are especially large at the top of the distribution, pointing to the
scarcity of nonwhites in high-paying industries and occupations (Soares, 2000; Hen-
riques, 2001; Campante, Crespo, and Leite, 2004; Chadarevian, 2011; Mariano et al.,
2018). Similar patterns have been documented in other Latin American countries
(e.g., Nopo, 2012). Yet, employers often argue that this pattern is due to the relative
shortage of qualified nonwhite workers, rather than to biases in their policies.
Our main analysis relies on the Relac¸a˜o Anual de Informac¸o˜es Sociais (RAIS), a
longitudinal matched worker-firm database with information on workers’ race, fea-
tures that are key for our approach. RAIS covers essentially all formal employment
in Brazil, but misses the informal sector. To address concerns over selectivity into the
formal sector, we thus begin by using household survey data from the Pesquisa Na-
cional por Amostra de Domic´ılios (PNAD) to study wages and participation rates
in formal and informal employment. We show that the raw shares of whites and
nonwhites employed in the formal sector are comparable within each gender, and
that there is no formality gap once we condition on age, location, and education. In
contrast, the unexplained racial pay gaps are large (and similar) in the two sectors.
Two other important considerations in our context are the classification of race
and the impacts of the minimum wage. Traditionally, nonwhites in Brazil are cate-
gorized into two groups: blacks and mixed race individuals, who comprise about 10%
and 40% of the population, respectively. Consistent with previous studies, we find
5Andrews (1992) presents an historical comparison of racial differences in the U.S. and Brazil
and concludes that differences were greater in the U.S. until the 1960s, but are now similar or even
larger in Brazil. See also Cavalieri and Fernandes (1998), Arcard and d’Hombres (2004), Reis and
Crespo (2015), Matos and Machado (2006), Garcia, Nopo, and Salardi (2009) and Bailey, Loveman,
and Muniz (2013) for more recent studies of racial wage differences in Brazil.
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that the wage and educational differences between these groups are small, though
both have lower levels of education and earn substantially less than whites of the
same gender. We therefore combine them into a single nonwhite category.6 Regard-
ing the minimum wage, simple histograms suggest that the federally legislated wage
floor exerts strong upward pressure on wages in many regions of Brazil, reducing
the effects of firm-specific wage setting and narrowing the wage gap between whites
and nonwhites.7 For our main analysis, we therefore focus on the Southeast region
– the highest-income region of Brazil – though we also present results for the entire
country. Additionally, we present separate results for workers with a high school
education or more, whose pay is less impacted by the mininum wage.
With this background, we turn to our results. Consistent with findings from the
U.S., Germany, and other countries, and with previous work by Lavetti and Schmutte
(2016) and Alvarez et al. (2018) on Brazil, we find that differences in the wage
premiums paid by different establishments explain an important share (≈ 20%) of
the variation in hourly wages for all four race-gender groups.8 The average workplace
premiums earned by whites are higher than those earned by nonwhites, accounting
for about one-quarter of the racial pay gap for both men and women.9 We also
find a strong pattern of positive assortative matching within each race-gender group.
Specifically, we estimate that establishments that pay 10% higher wage premiums
have workers who would earn 5-8% more at any workplace. Given the education gaps,
we would therefore expect to see some differential sorting of whites to higher-paying
6Cornwall, Rivera, and Schmutte (2017) present an interesting analysis of “endogeneity” in the
measurement of race in RAIS. We thus conduct a number of checks to assess the impacts of potential
measurement errors in employer-reported race in RAIS.
7Several recent papers, including Komastsu and Menezes-Filho (2016) and Alvarez et al. (2018),
argue that the rise in the minimum wage after the mid-1990s contributed to lowering overall wage
inequality in Brazil. Derenoncourt and Montialoux (2018) show that extensions in coverage of the
minimum wage in the mid-1960s contributed to a narrowing of black-white wage gaps in the U.S.
8Abowd, Lengermann, and McKinney (2003) find that between-firm variation represents about
17% of the variance of U.S. wages. Card, Heining, and Kline (2013), Card, Cardoso, and Kline
(2016), and Macis and Schivardi (2016) estimate a 15%-20% share for establishment effects in the
case of German workers, Portuguese male workers, and Italian manufacturing workers, respectively.
9A key issue underlying this comparison is how to benchmark the estimated establishment effects
for whites versus nonwhites. We use a normalization based on pay in the restaurant industry that
allows us to standardize the establishment (and person) effects for the two race groups (by gender).
We also evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to a range of assumptions on how much of
the racial pay gap in that industry is attributable to wage premiums paid only to whites, and to
normalizations based on other industries where wage-setting power is likely limited. To address the
issue that whites are concentrated in geographic areas with a higher fraction of larger and more
profitable firms, we also implement a simple reweighting procedure for all our decomposition results,
which adjusts the geographic distribution of nonwhites to match the distribution of whites.
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establishments even in the absence of any discriminatory employment policies.
To assess how much, we construct estimates of the distributions of white and
non-white workers in different skill groups in each local labor market, based on
age and the percentiles of their estimated person effects.10 We then compare the
actual employment shares of nonwhites at each workplace to the expected shares if
establishments maintained the skill-age composition of their labor force but selected
workers without regard to race from the available pool in their local labor market.
This counterfactual suggests that about two-thirds of the overall sorting effect –
accounting for about 12% of the overall racial wage gap – is explained by race-neutral
assortative matching. The remainder, which incorporates discriminatory hiring and
retention policies, accounts for another 6-8% of the overall racial wage gap.
Next, we use the estimated establishment-specific wage premiums to evaluate
the within-firm relative wage-setting effect. We find that the wage premiums for
nonwhites are compressed relative to those for whites – a pattern that is consistent
with monopsonistic wage setting and lower elasticities of firm-specific supply (“price
discrimination;” Barth and Dale-Olsen, 2009; Card et al., 2018) or lower bargaining
power (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Manning, 2011) for nonwhites than whites.
These lower average premiums explain another 5-6% of the overall racial wage gap.
Finally, we show that the wage losses associated with unexplained sorting and
differential wage-setting are largest for nonwhites with the highest levels of general
skills (as captured by their person effects), suggesting that the allocative costs of
race-based preferences may be relatively large in our setting.
Our work makes three main contributions. First, we advance the literature on
discriminatory employment policies and workplace segregation, offering comprehen-
sive estimates of the impacts of these practices on overall wage gaps for both males
and females in Brazil, and showing how the effects vary across the skill distribution.11
Second, we show how estimates from a two-way fixed effects model can be used to
benchmark the employment patterns at a given workplace relative to its local labor
market, while accounting in a flexible way for the skill composition at the workplace.
This is particularly important in settings like Brazil where there is a large racial gap
10Our approach generalizes the method proposed by Aslund and Skans (2010), which accounts
for observed skill characteristics of employees at a given workplace and in the surrounding labor
market, by accounting for any unobserved but time-invariant skill characteristics.
11Previous work by Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) used U.S. data from a single cross-section
and found that black workers were more likely than whites to work at higher-wage establishments -
the opposite of the pattern in our data. An early study by Ashenfelter (1972) similarly found that
black workers were more likely than whites to work at unionized jobs in the late 1960s. We are
unaware of any work for the U.S. that has longitudinal data covering all (or most) establishments
and includes racial status information.
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in education levels. Third, we contribute to the literature on racial wage differences
in Latin America, showing that firm-specific employment and pay-setting policies
contribute a substantial share of these gaps, that assortative matching would exacer-
bate racial inequalities even in the absence of any discrimination, but that race-based
preferences appear to play an important role at the top of the skill distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 begins with a descriptive analysis of
racial differences in the Brazilian labor market, based on the PNAD data. Section
2 presents our econometric setup and decomposition methods. We then provide a
brief descriptive analysis of our main RAIS samples in Section 3, focusing on the
plausibility of the conditions for OLS to yield interpretable estimates of employer
wage premiums. Sections 4 and 5 present our main estimation and decomposition
results, using data from the Southeast region of Brazil. The latter section ends with a
detailed analysis of how unexplained sorting and relative wage setting affect workers
at different points in the skill distribution. We evaluate the robustness of our findings
in Section 6, by replicating our analysis using other regions of the country, differ-
ent measures of race, different sub-periods of our sample, industries with different
degrees of interaction between employees and customers, and alternative normaliz-
ing assumptions regarding the wage premiums paid to whites and nonwhites in the
lowest-wage sectors of the economy. Section 7 concludes.
1 Background and Data
We begin by providing some background information on our empirical setting and
the data used in our analysis.
Legal Setting
Although African slave labor played a major role in colonial Brazil, a relatively fluid
notion of racial identity emerged in the post-slavery era, manifested by the absence
of de jure segregation and the acknowledgement of three main race groups: whites;
mixed race individuals (“pardos,” literally, brown people); and black/African race
individuals.12 Perhaps in part because of this fluidity, legal concerns over racial
discrimination emerged relatively late (Skidmore, 1992). Indeed, it was only with
the adoption of the 1988 Constitution and the passage of subsequent laws in 1989
and 1995 that racial discrimination in employment and pay setting became illegal
12See Skidmore (1974), Marx (1998), Telles (2004), and Andrews (1992) for detailed discussions.
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in Brazil.13 Nevertheless, a review of case law suggests that even in the early 2000’s
most claims of discrimination were dismissed (Equal Rights Trust, 2009).
Recently, however, the adoption of affirmative action policies in university ad-
missions (Francis and Tannuri-Painto, 2013, 2015) has led to heightened awareness
of racial issues in Brazil and a new law promoting racial parity (the Racial Equality
Law) was passed in 2010. Therefore, it is possible that employer policies regarding
employment and wage setting have evolved during the 13 years (2002-2014) included
in our sample. We explore this possibility as part of our robustness analysis.
Initial Descriptive Analysis
We begin by studying data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domic´ılios
(PNAD), a nationally-representative household survey. The PNAD covers both the
formal and informal sectors, allowing us to assess the potential role of formality in
mediating the size of the wage gap between different race groups. For consistency
with our RAIS data set (see below), we pool the 2002-2014 PNAD surveys.14 We
also limit attention (here and throughout the paper) to men and women age 25 to
54 with at least one year of potential experience (using age and years of schooling).
Table 1 provides an overview of the characteristics of the working-age population
in Brazil by gender (panels A and B) and race (columns 1-4), with a parallel analysis
for the Southeast region in columns 5-8.15 The Southeast region contains the states
of Esp´ırito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and Sa˜o Paulo, 42% of Brazil’s
population, and its most developed areas, including its three largest cities.16
The first row in each panel shows the fraction of the population in each race group.
In Brazil as a whole, about 50% of the working-age population are white (“branco”),
42% are mixed race (“pardo”), and 8% are black (“preto”). Together, these three
groups account for about 99% of the population, with Asians and indigenous groups
making up the remainder. In the Southeast, the share of whites is higher (56% of
men and 59% of women), while the share of mixed race individuals is lower (32-34%).
The second row shows the fractions of each group who were working as private-
13The Afonso Arinos Law, passed in 1951, was intended to deter racial discrimination, but is
widely believed to have had at most a symbolic effect (Campos, 2015).
14Ferreira, Firpo, and Messina (2014) present an analysis of PNAD data from 1995 to 2012.
They document trends over this period in returns to education, racial wage gaps, and overall wage
inequality, with particularly large changes from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s. To assess the
impacts of these underlying trends, we split our sample into earlier and later periods in Section 6.
15Similar descriptive statistics for the other regions are reported in Table D1 in the Appendix.
16A map showing Brazil’s regions and micro-regions (our definition of local labor market; see
below), as well as their racial composition, is presented in Figure C1 in the Appendix.
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sector nonfarm employees at the PNAD survey date (in September). About 43%
of men and 25% of women are in this class in Brazil; the remainder includes self-
employed workers, farm laborers, domestic workers, public sector employees, and
nonworkers. The private employment rate of men differs by only a few percentage
points (ppts.) across the three main race groups, but is more variable for women. In
the Southeast region, private employment rates of both genders are higher and less
variable across race groups. Specifically, the rate ranges from 47% (for whites) to 51%
(for blacks) for men and from 23% (for mixed race individuals) to 27% (for whites)
for women. This similarity implies that there is relatively little room for differential
selection biases among the subset of private-sector employees in each race group.
In the remaining rows, we show selected characteristics for nonfarm private-sector
employees.17 Among male private-sector employees, mean schooling is 8.4 years and
45% have completed high school. Both rates are higher among female employees,
reflecting the fact that women tend to be better educated than men in Brazil. White
men have about 1.6 years more schooling than mixed race or black men, and are 40%
more likely to have finished high school. The corresponding gaps between white and
mixed race or black women are smaller, but still notable. In the Southeast region,
mean levels of schooling and the high school completion rate are both higher, but
the gaps between the race groups are comparable to those in the country as a whole.
While the differences in education between whites and nonwhites in Brazil are
larger than those that currently prevail in the U.S. (see, e.g., Bayer and Charles,
2018), they are broadly consistent with gaps in other Latin American countries. Es-
teve and Lo´pez-Ruiz (2010), for example, document that the proportion of adults
in Brazil who have not completed primary education is about 20 ppts. higher for
nonwhites than whites. In Chile, the comparable gap between mapuches (the main
indigenous group) and non-indigenous people is about 15 ppts.; in Ecuador the gap
between blacks and whites is about 25 ppts.; and in Mexico the gap between indige-
nous Spanish speakers and non-indigenous people is about 23 ppts.
Looking next at the mean log hourly wage statistics presented in Table 1, two key
patterns stand out. First, mixed race and black workers earn 30-35% less than whites.
These gaps are similar for men and women, and in the Southeast region. Second,
mean log wages of all groups are roughly 10% higher in the Southeast region.
The level of Brazil’s minimum wage was relatively high during our sample pe-
riod.18 Indeed, 54% of male and 71% of female private-sector employees earned less
17All monetary values in the paper are deflated using the Consumer Price Index to a 2010 base.
18The ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage rose from 58% in 2002 to 70% in 2006, and
was relatively constant afterwards (see Melo, 2014). By way of comparison, the ratio of the Federal
minimum wage to the median wage was about 38% in the U.S. and 62% in France in 2012.
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than 200% of the minimum wage. Consistent with the patterns for mean log wages,
these fractions were higher for mixed race and black workers than for whites of either
gender, and lower in the Southeast region for all groups.
The impact of the minimum wage is illustrated visually in Figure 1, where we
show the distributions of log wages normalized relative to the minimum wage – i.e.,
log(w/min) – for white and non-white male workers in the Northeast region (the
poorest region of the country, with the highest fraction of black workers) and the
Southeast region (the richest region of the country).19 We show the distributions for
all male workers, for males with less than a high school education, and for males with
a high school education or more in the top, middle, and bottom panels, respectively.
For all three education groups in the Northeast region, we see a large spike in
the distribution at a relative wage of 1 (or a log relative wage of 0), coupled with a
stark asymmetry between the upper and lower tails of the distribution. These graphs
suggest that the minimum wage substantially attenuates any firm-specific component
of pay in the Northeast region and equalizes pay across race groups. The graphs for
workers in the Southeast region also show a notable spike at a relative wage of 1 and
some asymmetry between the upper and lower tails. Nevertheless, there is a clear
leftward shift in the distribution of wages for nonwhites relative to whites, suggesting
that the impact of firm-specific wage setting may be detectable, though it might be
attenuated for workers with less than a high school education.
To address concerns about the potential effects of the minimum wage we follow
two strategies. First, we focus on the Southeast region of the country for our main
analysis. Second, throughout our analysis, we present results for all education groups
and for higher-educated (high school or more) workers separately. The impacts of
the minimum wage appear to be relatively small for workers with at least a high
school education in the Southeast region, so the findings for this group may give a
clearer picture of what could be expected in the absence of a binding minimum wage.
Returning to Table 1, the last row of each panel shows the fraction of private-
sector employees who have a valid working card (“carteira de trabalho”) for their job
and are thus in the formal sector. This rate is about 80% in Brazil and 83% in the
Southeast region. Importantly, the formality rate is quite similar across race groups,
suggesting that differences in formality between the groups are not a major concern
for interpreting measured wage gaps in the formal sector (more on this below).
19Similar graphs for females are shown in Figure C2 in the Appendix.
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An Overview of Racial Wage Gaps
Table 2 presents estimates from a series of simple regression models that use data
from the PNAD to measure the size of the racial wage gaps for male and female
private-sector employees in Brazil (including formal and informal employees). Again,
we present parallel results for Brazil as a whole and for the Southeast region.20
We also present separate results for all workers and the subset with a high school
education or more. For each group we present two specifications: one that includes
only state and year effects, and another that adds controls for education (a set of five
dummies for incomplete elementary school, and complete elementary school, middle
school, high school, or college) and a quadratic function of potential experience.
The estimated wage gaps between whites and the two main groups of nonwhites
range from 27% to 33% when we control only for state and year effects. As has
been found in numerous previous studies, including the seminal studies by Oliveira,
Porcaro, and Arau´jo (1981) and Silva (1978, 1980, 1985), mixed race and black
workers receive similar average wages that are both far below the average wages
of whites. The racial wage gaps are quite similar for males and females, but are
about 3 ppts. larger in the Southeast than in Brazil as a whole, perhaps reflecting
the reduced impact of the minimum wage. Finally, the gaps are 3-5 ppts. larger for
better educated men, but only slightly larger for better educated women.
The racial wage gaps are substantially reduced when we add controls for education
and experience. For the country as a whole (column 2), the unexplained gaps fall to
11-13 ppts. for males and to 11 ppts. for females. The drop in magnitude compared
to the gaps without controls (column 1) reflects the relatively large racial differences
in educational achievement documented in Table 1, and the relatively high return to
education in the Brazilian labor market (e.g., Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002).
Interestingly, the unexplained gaps are very similar in the Southeast region (column
6). The wage gaps among workers with a high school education or more also fall
by nearly 50% when we add controls for education (in this case, a single dummy for
having completed a bachelor’s degree or more), though the gaps tend to be a little
larger for this group (13%-21%, versus 11%-14% for all workers).
These simple models lead us to two main conclusions. First, we confirm the
finding from other recent studies that mixed race and black workers face similar
wage penalties relative to whites. In the remainder of the paper, we thus combine
these two groups into a single non-white group. This has the advantage of creating
a relatively large non-white group, which is useful when we turn to two-way fixed
effects models. Second, we find that the unexplained wage gaps between whites
20Similar estimates for the other Brazilian regions are reported in Table D2 in the Appendix.
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and nonwhites are fairly similar in the Southeast and in the overall Brazilian labor
market. In the main analysis, we then focus on the Southeast region, but we present
results for the whole country in the robustness checks.
Wage Gaps in RAIS
Our main analysis uses the Relac¸a˜o Anual de Informac¸o˜es Sociais (RAIS), a longi-
tudinal data set that provides nearly universal coverage of formal jobs in Brazil.21
Firms submit annual information to the Ministry of Labor on all employees who were
on the payroll in the previous year, including their hiring and separation dates, av-
erage monthly earnings during the year, monthly earnings in December, contracted
hours, age, gender, education, and race. Worker information is reported at the es-
tablishment level along with the industry and municipality of the workplace. Race is
classified into the same categories used in PNAD, but is only available after 2002.22
Hence, we use the RAIS files from 2002 to 2014, the last year available for this study.
To construct an hourly wage, we use information on contracted monthly hours
and monthly earnings in December of each year, the month for which we measure
earnings precisely, restricting attention to individuals who worked for their employer
for the full month.23 Conceptually, this wage is similar to that in PNAD, which
also measures earnings and hours for a cross-section of jobs at one point in time in
each year. Finally, we exclude farm workers and those outside the 25-54 age range
from our RAIS samples (as in the PNAD samples), as well as workers on temporary
contracts, those who are not paid on a monthly basis (the usual pay period in Brazil),
and those with very low or very high wages (see details in Appendix A).
21Established in 1975, RAIS provides crucial information about the formal labor force in Brazil,
including labor market indicators made available to public and private organizations. The data
collected by RAIS are also used to administer a federal wage supplement to low-income formal
employees (“Abono Salarial”) and to monitor eligibility for various government programs, such as
the Brazilian conditional cash transfer program (“Bolsa Familia”). Compliance with the mandatory
reporting requirements is high because of large penalties when the data are late or incomplete.
22Cornwall, Rivera, and Schmutte (2017) describe in details the process by which employers record
race. The requirement for employers to record workers’ race was added as part of an effort to comply
with the ILO Convention 111, which deals with discrimination in the workplace. Newspaper articles
show that firms fought the new requirement at the time, but did not prevail.
23For the small fraction of workers who have more than one job in December, we first select the
job with the highest contracted hours, breaking any ties by selecting the job with the highest hourly
wage. In the few cases where hours and wages are identical on both jobs, we select one at random.
RAIS does not report actual hours worked, but we find no racial gap in actual hours worked for
formal-sector employees in PNAD (see Appendix Table D3). The PNAD data, which pertain to
September, may not perfectly capture differences in hours worked in December.
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A concern in RAIS is that race is sometimes recorded differently by different
employers: among workers in the Southeast region whose modal race is white, their
race is coded as mixed race or black about 10% of the time, while for those whose
modal race is nonwhite, their race is coded as white about 15% of the time.24 Similar
anomalies occur, albeit less frequently, for the recording of education, gender, and
birth year. To address these inconsistencies, we assign individuals their modal race,
education, gender, and birth year across all their observations in the RAIS sample.
A second concern is that, although RAIS includes detailed longitudinal informa-
tion for the formal sector, it excludes the entire informal sector. To assess how the
exclusion of the informal sector affects the measured racial wage gaps, we present
results from a series of models fit to the PNAD and RAIS samples in Table 3. The
models have the same full set of controls as the models in Table 2, but combine black
and mixed race individuals into a single non-white category.
The specifications in column 1 (for Brazil as a whole) and 5 (for the Southeast
region) model the probability of being in a formal job, conditional on being a private-
sector employee in PNAD. The coefficients fall in a narrow range from -0.01 to 0.01,
suggesting that formality rates of whites and nonwhites of both genders are nearly
identical when we control for education, experience, state of residence, and year.25
The remaining specifications in Table 3 model log hourly wages. The models
in columns 2 and 6 are fit to samples that include all private-sector employees in
PNAD, while those in columns 3 and 7 are fit to subsamples of formal-sector work-
ers in PNAD. Importantly, the estimated wage gaps between white and non-white
workers are very similar for both men and women regardless of whether informal
sector workers are excluded or not. Together with the relatively high overall rates
of formality among private-sector employees, this suggests that an analysis of racial
wage gaps in the formal sector can provide useful insights for the entire labor market.
Finally, columns 4 and 8 present results for our main RAIS samples. In particular,
we limit attention to employees at the largest connected sets of workplaces for both
white and non-white workers (of a given gender), which we call the “dual connected”
set of establishments (see the discussion in Section 3). Hourly wages are somewhat
higher than in the corresponding PNAD samples,26 while the racial wage gaps are a
little smaller, particularly for men. One partial explanation for the smaller wage gaps
24As discussed by Cornwall, Rivera, and Schmutte (2017), the inconsistent reporting of race is
not entirely due to random misclassification errors, since workers who move to a better paying job
tend to be more likely to switch from nonwhite to white (and vice-versa).
25Similar estimates for the other Brazilian regions are presented in Table D4 in the Appendix.
26This might be due to the use of actual earnings (which can include overtime payments) but
contracted hours. If overtime is more prevalent in December (when RAIS data are measured) than
September (the data collection month for PNAD), hourly wages will be higher in RAIS.
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in RAIS is that the mis-measurement of non-white racial status in the administrative
data (even after assigning individuals their modal race) leads to an attenuation bias.27
To assess this explanation, we re-estimated the models using only the subsample of
“consistent race” individuals whose (binary) race classification is the same in every
year they are observed in RAIS. This increases the magnitudes of the racial wage
gaps, leading to gaps for females that are very similar to those in PNAD, and gaps
for males that are only 2-3 ppts. smaller than in PNAD. In light of this finding, we
present results for workers with consistent race histories in our robustness analysis,
as well as for our full sample but classifying individuals by their first reported race
in RAIS rather than their modal race.
2 Econometric Framework
In this section, we present our econometric framework for measuring the effects of
firm-specific employment and pay-setting policies. We measure these effects by their
net impact on the racial wage gap. Specifically, we estimate models that capture
the wage premiums offered at each workplace, then perform simple counterfactual
exercises to evaluate the effects of assuming that (1) each workplace offered the same
wage premium (relative to other employers) to nonwhites and whites and (2) non-
whites and whites had the same probabilites of employment at different workplaces.
Our counterfactuals take the wages offered at each workplace as given and ignore the
equilibrium effects emphasized by Becker (1957) that can arise from discriminatory
preferences in the marketplace. Therefore, our procedure likely under-estimates the
overall impact of discriminatory preferences on the racial wage gaps.
Job Ladder Model of Wages
Building on Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) – henceforth AKM – we assume
that the log of the hourly wage paid to worker i in race-gender group g in period t
(ygit) is generated by a model of the form:




gitβg + εgit (1)
where αgi is a person effect that captures any time-invariant but fully portable com-
ponents of earnings capacity, ψgj represents a wage premium paid at establishment
j to workers in group g, J (g, i, t) is an index function indicating the workplace for
27In particular, the share of non-white workers among formal private-sector employees remains
smaller in RAIS than in PNAD, even after assigning individuals their modal race.
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worker i in group g in year t, Xgit is a vector of time varying controls (e.g., year
effects and controls for individual experience), and εgit is a time-varying error cap-
turing all other factors, including any person-specific job match effects.28 The ψgj
terms capture workplace-specific pay premiums, but impose the assumption that the
proportional premiums are the same for all workers in a given race-gender group.
One simple explanation for the presence of firm- or establishment-based premiums
is monopsonist wage setting (see Card et al., 2018, for a review). Assuming that
firms have some market power, they will set wages that are marked down relative
to marginal revenue products, with a factor that depends on the elasticity of supply
to the firm (Robinson, 1933; Boal and Ransom, 1997; Manning, 2003). Firms with
a higher demand for labor (arising, e.g., from entrepreneurial skill) will set higher
wages to attract a larger labor force. As discussed in Appendix B, under a set of
simplifying assumptions about the choice model causing different workers to choose
different employers and the substitutability between subgroups of workers, an optimal
wage-setting policy will be characterized by a set of group-specific premiums:
ψgj = δgRj (2)
where Rj is a measure of latent productivity at establishment j and δg is a markdown
factor that varies across subgroups of workers and is related to their elasticities of
firm-specific supply (as in models of price discrimination; more on this below). An
observationally equivalent model is that workers’ wages incorporate a share of the
surplus associated with their employment match, that the average match surplus
is higher at more productive firms, and that different groups have different average
bargaining power (Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Card, Cardoso, and Kline, 2016).
The empirical predictions of equation (1) depend on what is assumed about the
error component εgit. If the conditional expectation of εgit is assumed to be indepen-
dent of the job history of the worker – the “exogenous mobility” assumption required
for OLS estimation of (1) to yield unbiased estimates of the establishment effects –
then (1) implies that a worker in group g who moves from establishment k to estab-
lishment j will experience an average wage change of ψgj − ψgk , regardless of past or
future mobility patterns. A worker who moves in the opposite direction (from j to k)
will experience an equal and opposite expected wage change of ψgk −ψgj . This simple
symmetry prediction contrasts with the predictions from models of mobility driven
28The contributions of the person effect and the time-varying covariates are not separately iden-
tified without a normalizing assumption, as discussed in Card et al. (2018). Following their work,
we assume that in the baseline year X ′gitβg = 0 for 40-year old males and 35-year-old females, such
that the person effects are measured as of age 40 for men and 35 for women, which correspond
approximately to the peak of their experience profiles (see Figure C3 in the Appendix).
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by job match effects, which imply that movers in both directions will experience
positive average wage gains (see Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011, 2018, for a discussion
of alternative theoretical models of mobility and sorting). A series of specification
checks presented by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) suggest that although the ex-
ogeous mobility assumption can be rejected by formal testing, the predictions of an
AKM-type model with exogenous mobility are not too far off. In the next section
we review these checks using RAIS data and confirm that this is also true in Brazil.
Estimates of AKM-style models for various countries, including the U.S., Ger-
many, and Brazil, have found that workplace (or firm) effects in these models typi-
cally explain 15-25 percent of the overall variance of wages (see the review in Card
et al., 2018). Workers with higher person effects also tend to work at firms that pay
higher wage premiums. Such assortativeness has implications for wage inequality
because the variance of log wages for workers in group g can be decomposed as:




























A positive covariance between worker and establishment effects will magnify the
impacts of the person and firm components, contributing to higher overall inequal-
ity. As we discuss next, it also has important implications for the interpretation of
differential employment patterns in higher- and lower-premium workplaces.
Impacts of Sorting and Relative Wage-Setting on Racial Wage Gaps
We now ask how the presence of establishment-specific wage premiums contributes
to mean wage differences between groups. Suppose there are two groups, whites
(W ) and nonwhites (N), and let piWj and piNj represent the fractions of the groups
employed at workplace j. Then the mean wages of the two groups can be written as:












Subtracting these equations leads to a simple expression for the mean log wage gap
between whites and blacks:













so we can ignore the time-varying person components.29 Further rearrangement then
leads to two alternative decompositions:
E[ln yWit]− E[ln yNit] = αW − αN +
∑
j
ψWj (piWj − piNj) +
∑
j
(ψWj − ψNj )piNj(5)
= αW − αN +
∑
j
ψNj (piWj − piNj) +
∑
j
(ψWj − ψNj )piWj.(6)
Following Oaxaca (1973), the mean wage gap can be decomposed into a differ-
ence in mean characteristics between the two groups, weighted by the coefficients
for one of the two groups, and a difference in coefficients, weighted by the mean
characteristics of the other group. In a job ladder model, the “characteristics” are
simply person indicators and dummies for working at a given establishment, while
the “coefficients” are the worker effects and the establishment pay premiums. The
first term in equations (5) and (6) is just the difference in the mean person effects
for the two groups - what might be called the “average skill gap” between the two
groups. The other two terms measure the contribution of establishment pay and em-
ployment policies to the wage gap, with alternative choices for which group’s wage
premiums are used to weight the difference in employment shares, and which group’s
employment shares are used to weight the difference in establishment pay premiums.
In the analysis below we focus on the version of the decomposition specified by
equation (5). In this variant, the difference in pay premiums received by whites versus
nonwhites is weighted by the employment share of nonwhites, yielding an estimate of
the effect of differential pay-setting given the actual distribution of nonwhites across
establishments – a counterfactual that we believe is most natural. Likewise, the
difference in employment shares of whites and nonwhites is weighted by the wage
premium for white workers, yielding an estimate of the effect of differential sorting of
the two race groups across workplaces assuming that nonwhites were paid the same
premiums as whites – again, a counterfactual that we believe is natural.
Sorting Effect and Assortative Matching




j (piWj − piNj) in equation (5) will be zero
if the two groups have the same distributions of employment across establishments
(i.e., piWj = piNj for all j) or if there are no establishment-specific pay premiums
29As discussed below, this assumption is roughly correct for males in our data. For females,
however, there are some modest differences between whites and nonwhites.
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(as in traditional discrimination models), but it will be positive if white workers are
more likely to be employed at high-premium workplaces.
There are several reasons to suspect that this is true. One is that whites are
concentrated in geographic areas with a higher fraction of larger and more profitable
firms in Brazil. To address this issue, we implement a simple reweighting procedure
that adjusts the geographic distribution of nonwhites to match the distribution of
whites. Specifically, we form a weight for each nonwhite based on the relative frac-
tions of whites and nonwhites in his or her micro-region.30 We then construct a
weighted average wage for nonwhites, and weighted fractions of nonwhites at each
establishment. Since the decompositions in equations (4)-(6) remain valid using
weighted means, we can account for the differing geographic distributions of whites
and nonwhites in a simple non-parametric fashion.
A second explanation is suggested by the general finding of positive assortative
matching between higher-skilled workers and higher-paying establishments – a pat-
tern that is also true in Brazil (see below). Assuming that whites tend to have higher
overall human capital than nonwhites, and that higher-paying establishments hire
relatively more skilled workers, we would therefore expect to see more whites at these
establishments, even in the absence of other factors.
To account for such skill-biased employment patterns, we classify individuals (by
gender) into skill groups based on their age and the value of their estimated person
effects. We then calculate the fractions of workers at each establishment in each skill
group, and the share of nonwhites among all workers in each skill group in each local
labor market. Next, we calculate counterfactual employment shares of whites and
nonwhites, pi∗Wj and pi
∗
Nj, respectively, that would be expected if each establishment
maintained the skill distribution of its labor force in each year but selected workers
without regard to race from the available pool in its local labor market in that year.




Wj − pi∗Nj). (7)
This gives the net effect of skill-based (race-neutral) employment probabilities on the
racial wage gap, holding constant the skill distribution at each workplace, the wage
premium paid to white workers, and the racial composition of local labor markets.
A third explanation for an under-representation of nonwhites at higher-paying
establishments is discriminatory hiring and/or retention policies. We cannot directly
30A micro-region (“microrregia˜o”) is a legally defined geographic entity roughly equivalent to
a county. It closely parallels the notion of local economies by grouping economically integrated
contiguous municipalities with similar geographic and productive characteristics. The 557 micro-
regions in Brazil (160 of them are in the Southeast region) are shown in Figure C1 in the Appendix.
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test this explanation. We can, however, calculate the difference between the actual









Wj − pi∗Nj) (8)
To the extent that higher-premium establishments employ fewer nonwhites than
would be expected given their skill distribution and the nonwhite shares in each skill
group in their local labor market, the residual sorting effect D will be positive.
Relative Wage-Setting Effect




j −ψNj )piNj in equation (5) will be zero if ψWj =
ψNj = 0 for all j (as in traditional discrimination models), or if the pay premiums for
whites and nonwhites at each establishment are equal. It will be positive, however,
if whites tend to receive higher pay premiums than nonwhites at a given workplace.
As noted above, the simple monopsonistic pay-setting model developed by Card
et al. (2018) predicts a set of group-specific pay premiums of the form ψgj = δgRj
where Rj is a measure of relative productivity at establishment j and δg is a group-




where γ = δN/δW . Under these conditions, the relative wage-setting effect is:∑
j






If δN < δW – so nonwhites’ wage premiums at more productive employers are com-
pressed relative to whites’ – then γ < 1 and the pay-setting effect will be positive.
In the monopsonistic pay-setting model in Appendix B, δg depends on the relative
value that individuals in a group place on the wage versus nonwage features of a job,
and on the variation in the individual-specific valuations for a given job by individuals
in the group. Groups with a higher value of δg have more elastic supplies to a given
establishment, and therefore receive lower monopsonistic markdowns relative to their
marginal revenue products. For example, if δN/δW = 0.9 (i.e., nonwhites receive pay
premiums that are about 90% as large as whites) and the average pay premium
earned by nonwhites is 10%, the pay-setting effect will be about 1.1 ppts.
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Normalizing the Pay Premiums
An important feature of the sorting effect in equation (5) is that it depends on the
differences in establishment shares of whites and nonwhites. Since these establish-
ment shares sum to 1, the numerical value of the estimated sorting effect is invariant
to any additive transformation of the estimated pay premiums. To see this, consider
the transformation ψ˜Wj = ψ
W
j + τ. Since
∑
j τ(piNj − piWj) = 0 for any τ , the trans-
formed pay premiums imply the same numerical value of the sorting effect. This is
important because the pay premiums estimated in two-way fixed effects models are
always normalized relative to the pay premium in some reference firm (τ). Substan-
tively, this means that the overall sorting effect can be estimated without taking a
stand on how one normalizes the estimated pay premiums for a given group.
In contrast, the relative pay-setting effect in equation (5) depends on the dif-
ference in the estimated pay premiums for whites and nonwhites, and therefore on
the normalization of these premiums. Consider the same transformation as above:
ψ˜Wj = ψ
W
j + τ , which adds a positive constant τ to the premiums for whites (reflect-
ing, for example, a premium paid by firms in the reference sector to whites). This
will shift up the estimated pay-setting effect by the amount τ . Mechanically, it will
also reduce all the person effects for whites by the same factor, potentially affecting
the decomposition of the overall sorting effect into its skill-based and residual com-
ponents (as the person effects are used to classify individuals into skill groups). Note
that the key issue is how to normalize the establishment effects for whites relative
to nonwhites: a renormalization that adds the same factor to the premiums for both
race groups leaves these effects unchanged.
We address the normalization issue by assuming that in the restaurant sector,
a large employment sector for both men and women that is comprised of many
small firms that pay relatively low wages, the average pay premiums for whites and
nonwhites of both genders are zero. In essence, we assume that firms with little or no
rent to share pay zero premiums to all groups. It is possible to show that under the
assumptions posed by Card et al. (2018) about the shape of workers’ preferences for
jobs at different workplaces, firms that require only a small workforce set wages so
that their employees are close to indifferent between employment at the firm and a
non-work alternative (i.e., just above their reservation wage). In this case, assuming
that restaurants are “small” employers, our normalization assumption will be valid.
Interestingly, in both the PNAD and RAIS data, we find very small racial wage
gaps in the restaurant sector (see Table D5 in the Appendix). Specifically, models
like those in Table 3 that include state and year effects and controls for education
and experience show a racial wage gap in our RAIS samples of about 2ppts. to
3ppts. Under the assumption that workers receive wages that are proportional to
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their productivity in this sector, the implication is that the average skill gap between
nonwhites and whites in the restaurant industry is about 2ppts. to 3ppts.
A concern with our normalizing assumption is that, even in the restaurant sector,
there may be positive pay premiums for white workers that contribute to their higher
wage (e.g., if guests prefer being served by whites). As a robustness check, we
therefore evaluate the implications of choosing alternative normalizations such that
differential establishment-specific wage premiums account for about 50% or 100%
(i.e., 1.5 ppts. or 3 ppts.) of the observed wage gap between whites and nonwhites in
the restaurant sector.31 This amounts to adjusting all the establishment premiums
for whites upward (and all the person effects for whites downward) by 1.5 ppts. or 3
ppts. We also replicate our results by using a normalization based on other sectors
in which firms have likely little or no rent to share (e.g., auto repair services).
3 RAIS Samples and Specification Tests
We now describe our main RAIS samples and present specification tests supporting
the plausibility of the “exogenous mobility” condition for OLS to yield interpretable
estimates of establishment wage premiums, before we move to the estimation results.
RAIS Samples
We use longitudinal wage observations for private-sector employees in the RAIS
data set to estimate our two-way fixed effects models. Columns 1-4 of Table 4 first
show the characteristics of the four samples of workers in the Southeast region (one
for each race-gender group) that meet the selection criteria laid out in Section 1
(without imposing any restriction related to connected sets). We have about 44
million person-year observations over our 13-year period for about 9 million white
men, with samples about 70%, 45%, and 25% as big for white women, non-white
men, and non-white women, respectively. The age distributions of the four groups
are similar, while education varies more, with the highest levels of schooling among
white women and the lowest among non-white men. Mean log wages are about 10%
higher than in the PNAD samples described in Table 1, but the differences between
groups are similar. Nearly all workers are employed full time, with about 185 hours
per month (≈ 43 hours per week) among women and just slightly more among men.32
The fourth subpanel shows the mean establishment size and the mean fractions of
female and white employees in their workplace for the four groups. Weighted by the
31To be conservative, we use a gap of 3ppts. in the restaurant sector for both males and females.
32The most common contracts in Brazil specify a 44-hour or 40-hour workweek.
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number of worker-year observations, mean establishment sizes are relatively large,
and even larger for women than men and for nonwhites than whites.33 The extent of
segregation across establishments by race and gender is evident in the differences in
exposure rates of the four groups to white and female colleagues. The mean fraction
of white employees at a white worker’s establishment is about 30 ppts. higher than
at a non-white worker’s (of the same gender), while the mean fraction of females at
a female’s workplace is about 40 ppts. higher than at a male’s (of the same race).34
As was pointed out by AKM, the establishment effects in a two-way fixed effects
model are only identifiable within “connected sets” of workplaces that are linked
by worker mobility. Columns 5-8 in Table 4 present similar descriptive statistics
for the subsamples of workers in each race-gender group who work in the largest
connected set of establishments for that group. The largest connected set includes
97% of person-year observations for white men, 95% for non-white men, 95% for white
women, and 90% for non-white women. Mean wages are 1-2% higher for observations
in the largest connected sets, but other characteristics remain very similar.
The decomposition in equation (5) implicitly assumes that each establishment
has both white and non-white workers, so that one can calculate race-specific pay
premiums at each establishment. In reality there are many small establishments that
hire only white (or less often, only non-white) workers, even in the largest connected
set for each race-gender group. Columns 9-12 in Table 4 thus present the descriptive
statistics for those workers employed at establishments in the dual-connected sets
for their gender (i.e., in the connected sets for both white and non-white workers
of the same gender). These are the samples used for column 8 in Table 3. Among
males, the dual connected sets include about 91% of the person-year observations for
nonwhites, but only 81% of the observations for whites, reflecting the higher share of
all-white establishments.35 Among females, the corresponding rates are 86% of the
person-year observations for nonwhites and 71% of the observations for whites.
Narrowing the samples to workers at the dual-connected establishments has little
impact on the average age or education of the workers in the sample, but it leads
to an increase in average wages of about 5 ppts. for white men and women, and
about 2 ppts. for non-white men and women. This differential effect arises because
establishments that have only one race group tend to pay relatively low wages, and
33The finding that women work in larger establishments than men is also true in the U.S. (Papps,
2012) and the U.K. (Mumford and Smith, 2008).
34The difference in females’ versus males’ exposure to female coworkers in the RAIS data is
slightly smaller than in Portugal (Card, Cardoso, and Kline, 2016), but similar to that in the
U.K. (Mumford and Smith, 2008). Data for relatively large establishments in the U.S. show less
segregation by race or gender than in RAIS (Hellerstein, Neumark, and McInerney, 2008).
35The shares of all-white establishments are higher because of the larger sample sizes for whites.
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more of such establishments are present in the connected sets for white workers.
Some Specification Tests for Exogenous Mobility
A concern with any conclusion based on two-way fixed effects models is that OLS
estimates of the firm wage premiums will be biased unless worker mobility is uncorre-
lated with the time-varying residual components of wages. Card, Heining, and Kline
(2013) developed an event-study analysis of the wage changes experienced by workers
moving between different groups of firms to assess the plausibility of this “exogenous
mobility” assumption. Specifically, they proposed grouping establishments by the
average pay of coworkers, and tracking the changes in wages for workers who move
up and down the “job ladder” with rungs defined by quartiles of co-worker pay.
Figure 2 shows the results of this analysis using our four race-gender groups
in RAIS. The samples are restricted to individuals who switch workplaces and are
observed in two consecutive years at both the origin and destination establishments.
Workplaces are grouped into coworker pay quartiles using wages of all coworkers (i.e.,
both races and both genders) in the year of hiring (for destination establishments) or
separation (for origin establishments). For clarity, only the wage profiles of workers
who move from jobs in quartile 1 and quartile 4 are shown in the figures.
The figures exhibit clear step-like patterns for all four race-gender groups: when
workers move to higher-wage establishments, their wages tend to rise, but they tend
to fall when workers move to lower-wage establishments. There is little evidence of
differential trends before or after a move for workers who move up or down the job
ladder, but there are clearly permanent differences in wages prior to a move that
are correlated with the direction of the move. For example, workers who start at
a 4th quartile establishment and move to another 4th quartile establishment have
substantially higher wages in the two years prior to the move than those who start
at a 4th quartile establishment and move down. Such differential mobility on the
basis of the permanent component of wages is fully consistent with the exogenous
mobility assumption, since the AKM model conditions on a worker fixed effect.
As discussed above, a stark prediction of an AKM model with exogenous mobility
is that wage changes associated with movements up the job ladder should be equal
and opposite to wage changes for corresponding movements down the ladder. Figure
2 suggests that this is the case in our data, but Figure 3 presents more systematic
evidence in support of this symmetry prediction. We use the same sample of movers,
but we group origin and destination firms in 20 quantiles of co-worker wages. For
each of the 20 × 20 pairs of quantiles, we then plot the mean change in log wages
for the movers in the year after vs. before the move against the mean difference in
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log wages of co-workers at the destination vs. origin establishment.36 For each of the
four race-gender groups, the symmetry prediction seems to hold such that a linear fit
captures the relationship between changes in own wages and co-worker wages closely.
Interestingly, one can also see that the slope is flatter for nonwhites than for whites,
indicating that nonwhites may benefit less from moving up the job ladder.
The results in Figures 2 and 3 suggest that a simple AKM model estimated by
OLS will provide interpretable estimates of the wage premiums offered at different
establishments for different race-gender groups. We discuss additional diagnostic
evidence based on the residuals from the estimated models in the next section.
4 Estimation Results
In this section, we present the results from estimating the two-way fixed effects model
in equation (1) by race-gender group, using the largest connected sets described in
columns 5-8 in Table 4.37 We also provide evidence of strong assortative matching
between workers and establishments for each group, which is robust to the well-known
bias in the covariance of person and establishment effects with AKM models.
Estimation Results and Model Fit
Table 5 summarizes the estimation results. We show the standard deviations of the
person effects, of the establishment effects, and of the covariate index X ′gitβ̂g, as well
as the correlation of the worker and establishment effects, the adjusted R-squared
of the models, and the implied variance decomposition based on equation (3). For
reference, we also show the fit statistics for a more general “job match” model that
includes a separate dummy for each worker-establishment match.
In general, the two-way fixed effects models fit well, with adjusted R-squared
statistics of around 90%. Nevertheless, RMSE’s (root-mean-squared-errors) of the
models are around 15% higher than those of the corresponding job match model.
A comparison of residual variances between these models allow us to calculate the
variance of the job match effects, i.e., the common component of εgit across all
observations of a given worker at a given workplace. As shown in the table, the job
match component is relatively small, accounting for just 3-4% of the overall variance
36Movers’ wage changes are adjusted for trends based on coefficients from a regression estimated
on the sample of stayers, workers who remain at the origin establishments. The model includes the
same education dummies as in Table 2 and a quadratic in age fully interacted with these dummies.
37The covariates Xgit include year dummies interacted with the same five education dummies as
in Table 2, and quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with the education dummies.
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of wages. This small magnitude means there is only limited scope for job match
effects to drive mobility patterns and invalidate the exogenous mobility assumption.
The variance shares show that fixed worker characteristics account for 50-60%
of the variance of wages in the Southeast region, with a larger share among females
than males, while the establishment effects account for 21-25% of the variance.38 The
covariance between these two sets of effects is positive and accounts for another 7-
18% of the variance of wages. These variance shares are similar to those reported by
Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) for Germany, and by Lavetti and Schmutte (2016)
and Alvarez et al. (2018) for Brazil, based on broadly similar RAIS samples.
We present additional evidence on the goodness of fit of the AKM model for our
four groups in Figure C5 in the Appendix. We show the mean residuals for each of
100 cells, formed by assigning workers and establishments into 10 equally-sized bins
based on their corresponding estimated effects. The mean residuals in each cell are
close to zero, with the exception of cells representing workers with low person effects
employed at workplaces with low establishment effects, where the mean residuals are
positive. This pattern is most pronounced for non-white females, and is consistent
with upward pressure from the minimum wage that is particularly important for
low-skilled workers at low-paying establishments. We evaluate the sensitivity of our
decomposition results to these observations in our robustness checks in Section 6.
Assortative Matching
The results in Table 5 reveal that workers with higher earnings capacity at any
establishment (as represented by their person effects) are more likely to work at es-
tablishments that pay higher wage premiums. This holds for all race-gender groups,
but the correlations between the worker and establishment effects are smaller for non-
whites than for whites, suggesting that there may be differences in the propensities
of high-premium establishments to hire whites versus nonwhites.
As is well known in the literature, these estimated correlations have to be inter-
preted carefully because the sampling errors in the estimated worker and establish-
ment effects are negatively correlated, leading to a downward bias (Mare´ and Hyslop,
2006; Andrews et al., 2008). The magnitude of the expected bias is larger for “thin
networks” (Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten, 2018), a problem that is likely more severe
for nonwhites than whites in our samples. For example, there are 6.6 white males but
only 5.1 non-white males per establishment in our largest connected sets, suggesting
38Table D6 in the Appendix presents the corresponding estimates using observations for the whole
country. The results are quite similar: the correlation between the establishment effects estimated
in each sample for Southeast establishments is close to 1 (see Figure C4 in the Appendix).
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that there are likely to be fewer network links between establishments for nonwhites.
It is possible to derive a corrected correlation (Kline, Saggio, and Sølvsten, 2018),
but it is more straightforward to use standard methods to correct the partial regres-
sion coefficient relating worker effects to establishment effects. Consider a descriptive
regression fit over person-year observations in a given race-gender group g:
α̂gi = λ0g + λ1gψ̂
g
J(g,i,t) + ξgit. (11)
The coefficient λ1g gives the expected change in the person effect per unit increase
in the estimated establishment effect, and provides a convenient metric for assessing
the degree of assortative matching. Since the sampling errors in the person and
establishment effects are negatively correlated, we expect OLS estimates of λ1g to be
negatively biased. The estimates of ψgj for other race-gender groups are estimated on
separate samples, however, and are therefore uncorrelated with the estimated person
effects for a particular group. Assuming that establishment effects for different groups
are correlated with each other, we can use the estimated establishment effects for
another group as instrumental variables, yielding corrected estimates of λ1g.
We implement this procedure in Table 6, restricting attention to person and
establishment effects in the dual-connected sets for each gender, and using the es-
tablishment effects for the same gender but opposite race group as instruments.39
For reference, the first row of the table shows the unadjusted correlations of the
worker and establishment effects. Next, we present OLS and IV estimates of the λ1g
coefficients. We show estimates from two models: one with no other controls and one
that controls for micro-region fixed effects (and therefore control for the availability
of different subgroups of workers in each local labor market). Finally, we present the
first stage coefficients, which are relatively large and show very strong correlations
between the estimated establishment effects for whites and nonwhites of each gender,
as would be expected if the wage-setting model given by equation (9) is correct.
Consistent with the patterns for the simple correlation coefficients, the OLS esti-
mates of λ1g are only about half as big for non-white men as white men and one-third
as big for non-white women as white women. The IV estimates are uniformly larger
but still show less assortative matching for nonwhites. Specifically, the IV estimate
of λ1g is about 20% lower for non-white men than white men, and 15% lower for
non-white women than white women.
Figure 4 provides additional evidence on the degree of assortative matching. We
show the fractions of workers employed at establishments in each quartile of the
39We do not re-estimate the AKM models, we simply estimate OLS and IV versions of equation
(11) using the subsets of person-year observations in the dual-connected sets.
24
distribution of estimated pay premiums, separately for workers in five education cat-
egories: incomplete elementary school, and complete elementary school (including
those with incomplete middle school), middle school (including those with incom-
plete high school), high school (including those with incomplete college), or college.
For all race-gender groups, the college-educated subgroup is most likely to work at
high-premium establishments: 47%-59% of college-educated workers are employed
at quartile 4 establishments, compared to only 10%-19% of workers with only ele-
mentary schooling. Moreover, for both genders, there appears to be more assortative
matching for whites than for nonwhites, consistent with the findings in Table 6.40
These results point to two main conclusions. First, there is strong positive assor-
tative matching between workers and establishments for all four race-gender groups.
On average, establishments that pay higher wage premiums hire workers with higher
permanent components of wages and higher education. The IV estimates in Table 6
suggest that an establishment that pays a 10% higher wage premium has employees
whose average earnings capacity is 5-7% higher. Second, the strength of the assorta-
tive matching appears to be lower for nonwhites than whites of either gender. This
gap suggests that race matters in the determination of employment probabilities,
even controlling for workers’ skills.
5 Decomposition results
We now use the results from the estimated two-way fixed effects models summarized
in Table 5 to measure the effects of employment and wage-setting policies on the
racial wage gap. We begin by decomposing the racial wage gap into worker-specific
components and a component attributable to establishment pay premiums. We
also relate these components to results from a standard Mincerian model. We then
decompose the contribution of establishments into a relative wage-setting effect and
a sorting effect, and further decompose the latter into a skill-based sorting and a
residual sorting effect. Finally, we investigate how the wage losses associated with
residual sorting and differential wage setting vary across the skill distribution.
Decomposing the Racial Wage Gap into Person and Establishment Effects
As discussed in Section 2, an initial step is to normalize the establishment effects.
This allows us to decompose the wages of any individual – or group – into a com-
40For instance, the difference in the share of workers with a college degree vs. with only elementary
schooling employed in quartile 4 establishments reaches 46 ppts. and 41 ppts. for white men and
women, respectively, but only 36 ppts. and 33 ppts. for non-white men and women, respectively.
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ponent due to their person effect and time varying characteristics, and a component
attributable to the premiums paid by their employer. As a baseline, we assume that
establishments in the restaurant sector pay zero wage premiums to either race-gender
group, on average. Under this assumption, the normalized employer effects repre-
sent wage differences relative to jobs where each worker is paid according to his or
her productivity (i.e., with no monopsonistic markdown or rent premium). Figure 5
displays the distribution of implied average pay premiums by 3-digit sector for white
workers. The estimated sector premiums for white males range from near zero – thus
near the restaurant sector, which is the 9th in rank order – for sectors such as delivery
services (-0.07), auto repair services (-0.03), and footwear manufacturing (-0.01) to
around 0.9 for sectors such as auto manufacturing (0.85) and petroleum extraction
(0.90). The ranking is similar for females; the rank correlation with male estimates
is 0.93. Interestingly, the high- and low-premium sectors correspond fairly closely to
the high- and low-wage sectors identified by Krueger and Summers (1988).41
Table 7 presents results from implementing the decomposition of the average
racial pay gap based on equation (4) using individuals in the dual-connected set of
each gender in the Southeast region, with and without reweighting to correct for
differences in the geographic distribution of whites and nonwhites (see Section 2).
We also present results for subsets of workers with vs. without a high school degree.42
Without reweighting, differences in the mean person effects account for about
70% of the white-nonwhite wage gap for both males and females, while differences
in the establishment effects account for 30-35%. Differences in the covariate index
account for a negligible share of the male wage gap, but actually widen the female
gap slightly, particularly for the higher-educated subgroup. This arises because the
experience profiles for higher-educated non-white women are somewhat flatter than
the profiles for whites (this can be seen in Figure C3 in the Appendix). Adjusting
women’s wages to an age-35 basis, as we do, thus raises the white-nonwhite gap in
the estimated person effects, with an offsetting negative gap in the covariate indexes.
Reweighting for the different locations of whites and nonwhites reduces the racial
wage gaps in the first column of Table 7 by 3-4 ppts. A majority of the reduction
comes from a reduction in the size of the establishment component, which is con-
sistent with the idea that area-based wage differentials will be incorporated in the
establishment premiums and that whites are more likely to live in high-wage areas.
Nevertheless, the reweighting also leads to some reduction in the person-effects com-
ponent (with the exception of females with completed high school), implying that
41Table D7 in the Appendix shows the rank correlation between our ranking of sectors and theirs.
42We do not re-estimate the AKM models, we simply implement the decomposition in equation
(4) in subsets of the dual-connected sets restricted by education levels.
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there are relatively more high-earning whites than nonwhites in local labor markets
with more high-premium firms (this is shown in Figure C6 in the Appendix).43 Over-
all, the wage gaps remain sizable, however, particularly for higher-educated workers
for whom the wage gaps are 5 to 6 times larger than for lower-educated workers.
Focusing on the location-adjusted results, our estimates imply that the 18.6 ppt.
average racial wage gap for males is attributable to a 14.4 ppt. gap in permanent
earnings capacity and a 4.4 ppt. gap in average pay premiums. Similar comparisons
for females show that the 26.1 ppt. overall racial wage gap arises from a 21.6 ppt.
gap in permanent earnings capacity, a 7.1 ppt. gap in average pay premiums, and a
-2.6 ppt. gap in experience-related factors. Thus, the white-nonwhite difference in
mean establishment premiums accounts for about one quarter of the overall wage
gap for both genders (the same holds true for the higher-educated subgroup).
This decomposition relies on the assumption that workers of both race groups are
paid their true productivity in the restaurant industry. If one assumes instead that
the 3 ppt. wage gap in that sector (see Section 2) is entirely due to wage premiums
for whites, then the component attributed to differences in earnings capacity falls
mechanically to 11.4 ppts. for men and 18.6 ppts. for women, and the component
attributed to differences in average employer pay premiums rises to 7.4 ppts. for men
and 10.1 ppts. for women, or about 40% of the overall racial wage gap.
Relating our Decomposition Results to a Standard Mincerian Model
A question that naturally arises with the decomposition in Table 7 is how it relates
to the usual Mincerian decomposition of the racial wage gap into an “explained”
component (due to education and experience) and an “unexplained” component.
We address this in Appendix Table D8, which presents the joint distribution of the
Mincerian components of the wage gap and the AKM-based components (due to
person effects, establishment effects, and covariates).
This exercise points to three main conclusions. First, a majority of the unex-
plained wage gap from a Mincer specification is attributable to differences in average
person effects between whites and nonwhites (about 80% for males and 65% for fe-
males). In other words, differences in person effects explain a fairly large share of
the unexplained residual from a simple cross-sectional wage model, though 20-35%
is attributed to differences in firm effects. Second, about 60% of the racial gap in
person effects from an AKM decomposition is due to differences in education and
experience. The remaining 40% may be attributed to factors like school quality or
43The figure shows the correlation between the fractions of high-skilled white workers and high-
paying jobs across micro-regions. Figure C7 displays the distributions of estimated person effects.
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parental inputs that are unobserved in a conventional Mincer model.
Third, and most interestingly, differences in education and experience explain an
important share of the racial gap in the AKM establishments effects (around 60%
of the gap for workers of all education levels, and 45% for those with a high-school
degree). Such a pattern is expected given the degree of sorting of higher-educated
workers to higher-paying establishments shown in Figure 4. Indeed, if employers paid
similar premiums to whites and nonwhites, and education and age were the only
factors that affected the probability of being employed at a higher-wage premium
workplace, then education and experience would explain the entire difference in the
average establishment premiums between whites and nonwhites. The fact that there
is a residual component for the establishment effects motivates our next analyses.
Decomposing the Effect of Employment and Wage-Setting Policies
We decompose the gap in average establishment premiums into a between-firm sort-
ing effect and a within-firm relative wage-setting effect in Table 8, using the frame-
work of equation (5). We show the overall wage gap (column 1), the mean estab-
lishment effects for whites and nonwhites (columns 2 and 3, respectively), the mean
difference in establishment effects (column 4), and the two components of equation
(5): the sorting and relative pay-setting effects (columns 5 and 6, respectively).
As noted in the discussion of Table 7, the average gap in establishment effects
between whites and nonwhites accounts for about one quarter of the overall wage gap
for both men and women (see column 4). The entries in column 5 imply that most of
the establishment effect is attributable to the under-representation of nonwhites in
higher-premium workplaces. Evaluated using the wage premiums earned by whites at
different workplaces, the differential sorting of white and non-white workers accounts
for about 20% of the overall wage gap for all groups but lower-educated males, for
whom the average gap in establishment effects is small to begin with (1 ppt.).
Relative to the size of the sorting effects, the wage-setting effects in column 6 are
modest in size, on the order of 1 ppt. for men and 1.5 ppts. for women. Some insight
into this finding is provided by equation (10) and the pattern in Figure 6, which
shows simple bin-scatters of the relationship between the estimated pay premiums
for whites and nonwhites (separately by gender). For both gender groups, we find
that nonwhite pay premiums are strongly correlated with white pay premiums, and
that an empirical relationship of the form ψNj = γψ
W
j is highly plausible. To estimate
the slope parameter γ while accounting for estimation errors in the white premiums,
we use the premiums for white women as instruments for the premiums for white men
(and vice versa), using the fact that establishment effects for different genders are
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correlated with each other. This approach leads to estimates of γ = 0.94 for males
and γ = 0.9 for females. Given the magnitudes of the average premiums earned by
non-white men (0.175) and women (0.085), equation (10) predicts pay-setting effects
that are close to the estimates in Table 8 (particularly for men), providing some
empirical support for the monopsonistic pay-setting model in Card et al. (2018).
As noted earlier, the value of the pay-setting effects – but not of the sorting ef-
fects – depends on the normalization of the establishment effects. If, for example, we
assume that the 3 ppt. white-nonwhite gap in the restaurant sector is attributable to
a difference in pay premiums received by whites rather than a difference in produc-
tivity, we would then increase the relative pay-setting effect by 3 ppts., leading to an
effect of about the same size as the sorting effect (and implying that differences in
establishment premiums explain about 40% of the racial wage gap for both genders).
Decomposing the Sorting Effect into Skill-Based and Residual Sorting
Our final step is to decompose the sorting effect into a skill-based component – due
to assortative race-neutral matching – and a residual component, using equations
(7) and (8), respectively. As discussed in Section 3, we form a counterfactual racial
composition for each establishment by calculating the expected fraction of nonwhites
if the establishment selected randomly in the pool of suitable workers in their local
labor market. Specifically, we divide workers of each gender into 16 bins defined by
four age categories (25-27, 28-36, 37-45, and 46-54) and four quartiles of the overall
distribution of person effects (combining whites and nonwhites).44 Next, we calculate
the fraction of employees at each establishment in each skill bin, and the nonwhite
share of each skill bin in its local labor market (micro-region). We then combine these
to calculate the expected fractions of whites and nonwhites at the establishment,
which we then use to calculate the counterfactual establishment shares pi∗Wj and pi
∗
Nj,
and the counterfactual skill-based sorting effect given by equation (7).45
Figure 7 presents our results graphically (given the negligible contribution of
establishments for lower-educated workers shown in Tables 7 and 8, we simplify our
graphs – here and in subsequent figures – by showing results for all workers and
those with at least a high school education). In each panel, the black line displays
the actual share of nonwhites by decile of the establishment-effect distribution. The
red and blue lines in each panel represent counterfactual shares under two scenarios.
44We obtain similar results using finer skill categories, e.g., using octiles rather than quartiles of
the distribution of estimated person effects (see Table D9 in the Appendix).
45Define Nkj the number of workers at establishment j in skill bin k, and pWk the share of white
workers in skill bin k in the local labor market. The counterfactual numbers of white and non-white
workers at establishment j are simply:
∑
kNkj · pWk and
∑
kNkj · (1− pWk), respectively.
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First, we assume that each establishment maintains its existing age structure but
selects workers at random within age categories (i.e., without regard for race or skill)
from its local labor market. This gives the “naive” counterfactual shown by the red
line. Second, we assume that each establishment maintains its joint distribution of
age and skill but selects workers at random within age-skill categories (thus, without
regard for race), yielding the “full” counterfactual shown by the blue line.
The top panels combine workers of all education levels. We see that the actual
shares of non-white workers are relatively constant across the lower deciles of the
establishment effect distribution, but then decrease sharply, falling from about 0.35
to 0.25 for men and a little more for women. In contrast, the share of nonwhites
predicted by our naive benchmark remains nearly constant, as we move across the
firm effect deciles, implying that age differences are unimportant in understanding the
differential sorting of whites and nonwhites to high- and low-premium establishments.
Unlike the pattern for the naive counterfactual, the predicted non-white shares
under our full counterfactual exhibit a downward-sloping pattern across the deciles,
reflecting the racial gap in person effects and the tendency for higher-premium work-
places to hire workers with higher person effects. The blue lines fall between the red
and black lines, suggesting that skill-based employment policies explain some, but
not all, of the under-representation of nonwhites at higher-premium workplaces.
The bottom panels of Figure 7 show results for men and women with at least a
high school education. For these workers, the share of nonwhites at establishments
in the top two deciles of the premium distribution is about 6 ppts. and 8 ppts.
lower than would be expected under the naive counterfactual for men and women,
respectively. Moreover, skill-based sorting explains only about half of that difference.
These results are summarized quantitatively in columns 7 and 8 of Table 8. Skill-
based sorting accounts for about two-thirds of the sorting effect for men, and a similar
share for the subgroup with high school or more. These shares are slightly lower for
women (about 55%-60%). The residual sorting effect – which includes any effect
of discriminatory employment policies by higher-premium establishments – accounts
for about 6% of the overall racial wage gap for men and 8% for women.
Variation in the Residual Sorting and Wage-Setting Effects by Skill
The results in Table 8 suggest that the impacts of race-based preferences in firms’
pay-setting and employment policies are larger for higher-educated nonwhites. To
give a fuller picture, we show how the magnitudes of the residual sorting and relative
wage-setting effects vary across skill levels (as captured by the person effects).
Specifically, we first divide workers of both races into 10 decile groups based on
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their estimated person effects (the deciles are defined pooling whites and nonwhites
together, separately by gender). For workers in each decile group, we then calculate
the mean value of the estimated white establishment effects at workplaces of white




j piWj using employment shares for whites in
that decile group) and at workplaces of non-white workers (which corresponds to∑
j ψ̂
W
j piNj). The gap between the mean white establishment effects of the two
groups represents the sorting effect for workers in that person-effects decile. Since
we are conditioning on the values of the person effect, however, the difference has
the interpretation of a residual sorting effect (it differs very slightly from the concept
used in Table 8 because we do not also condition on age). Figure 8 shows the means
for each decile group for all male and female workers (upper panels) and for those
with at least a high school education (lower panels).
A concern with this simple exercise is that the estimation errors in the white
establishment effects are negatively correlated with the errors in the estimated white
person effects. This correlation will be magnified in the bottom and top deciles:
whites classified as having the lowest person effects (resp. highest person effects)
will on average have negative estimation errors (resp. positive estimation errors) in
their person effects, implying that the associated average firm effects will be “too
high” (resp. “too low”). This is clearly visible in the “dip” in the value of the mean
white establishment effect for white workers between the first and second deciles.
As expected, there is no such pattern in the mean white establishment effects for
non-white workers, since there is no correlation between the estimation errors in the
establishment effects for whites and the person effects for nonwhites.
With that caveat in mind, these is a clear tendency for higher-skilled workers of
both race groups to work at establishments with higher pay premiums. There is also
a systematic divergence between the mean establishment effects for whites and non-
whites, implying that higher-skilled nonwhites are systematically under-represented
at the best-paying workplaces, even conditional on their ability. The difference in the
top decile reaches 4.3 ppts. for men and 4.9 ppts. for women, and given the sampling
error issue, these are likely under-estimates of the true residual sorting effect.
Figure 9 presents a parallel analysis for the relative pay-setting effect. Here we
plot the mean of the estimated white establishment effects and the mean of the







j piNj, respectively) in each decile. The gap between these two
means represents the relative pay-setting effect for workers in that person-effects
decile. Apart from the dip from the first to second deciles in the non-white es-
tablishment effects, which is likely due to the sampling error issue discussed above
(accordingly, there is little or no dip in the means of the white establishment effects),
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there is a strong tendency for establishment effects to rise across the skill distribu-
tion. Moreover, the difference between the mean white and nonwhite establishment
effects at workplaces of non-white workers widens across the deciles. For example,
the gap amounts to a 4.7 ppt. and 6.4 ppt. wage penalty for male workers in the
8th and 9th skill deciles, respectively. The gaps are even larger in the 10th decile,
but these are likely over-estimated by a negative correlation between the estimation
error in the nonwhite establishment effects and the error in the estimated nonwhite
person effects among nonwhites in the top decile.
To show that our main conclusions are robust to the estimation error issue, we
reproduce Figures 8 and 9 in the Appendix (see Figures C8 and C9, respectively) but
using the estimated establishment effects of the other gender. For instance, in the
top-left panel of Figure C8, we plot the mean value of the estimated establishment
effects for white females at workplaces of white males and at workplaces of non-white
males for each decile of the male person-effects distribution. The establishment
effects for different genders are correlated with each other (a fact that we used for
our IV strategy in Figure 6), but there is no correlation between the estimation error
in the female establishment effects and the error in the estimated male person effects
(and vice-versa). Accordingly, the differential “dips” from the first to the second
deciles in Figures 8 and 9 disappear. As in Figure 8 and 9, in contrast, the residual
sorting and relative pay-setting effects (now evaluated using establishment effects of
the other gender) still widen systematically across the person-effects deciles.46
In summary, we infer that the costs of unequal employment and pay setting poli-
cies is disproportionately born by highly-skilled nonwhites. These results corroborate
the work of scholars who highlight the “elitist” nature of racial discrimination in the
Brazilian labor market (e.g., Campante, Crespo, and Leite, 2004), and suggest that
the allocative costs of race-based preferences may be relatively large in Brazil.
6 Robustness
The results presented so far are based on a series of choices about sample and speci-
fication. We focus on workers in the Southeast region; use the modal race for people
with a changing racial classification over time; impose a specific normalization for
the establishment effects; and pool all the data for the available sample period. In
this section, we show how our decomposition results vary as we vary these choices.
For ease of comparison, we summarize our findings graphically in Figure 10,
46The specific point estimates in Figures C8 and C9 have to be interpreted with caution because
the establishment effects for different genders are unlikely to be perfectly correlated with each other.
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with separate panels for workers of all education levels and for the higher-educated
subgroups – for whom all the effects that we estimated are systematically larger.47
For each alternative sample or specification choice, the height of the stacked column
represents the mean white-nonwhite wage gap and its four components represent
the gaps attributed to skill-based sorting, residual sorting, relative wage-setting,
and differences in person effects and covariates, respectively. For reference, the first
column in each panel reproduces our baseline results from Table 8.
We begin by extending our analysis to the whole country. To do this, we re-
estimated our AKM models pooling RAIS data from all Brazilian regions, and then
repeated our decompositions with the new set of worker and establishment effects.48
As shown in the second column of each panel, the overall wage gap is about 3 ppts.
smaller for males and 4 ppts. smaller for females in the national sample. The relative
shares of the gap attributed to the various components, however, are typically within
1 ppt. of the corresponding shares in the Southeast sample.
We also fitted a separate set of AKM models, and repeated our decompositions,
using only observations from the Northeast region. In this case, the wage gaps are
smaller, and the sorting and relative pay-setting effects are scaled down accordingly.
We find that skill-based sorting is relatively less important in the Northeast than
in our baseline sample (or the national sample), while residual sorting is somewhat
more important. Overall, however, the relative share of the wage gap accounted for
by establishment-specific pay premiums is remarkably stable across regions.
As noted in Section 1, some individuals in RAIS are classified as white in some
years and as nonwhite (black or mixed race) in others. For our baseline results, we
resolved this issue by assigning each individual his or her modal race group. As a
simple alternative, we classified each individual using the first race group they were
ever assigned to in RAIS. We then re-estimated our AKM models and performed
a new set of decompositions. In so doing, the overall racial wage gap increases a
bit for men but remains very similar for women. The relative shares of the various
components are again comparable to those in our baseline results, although the pay-
setting effects are slightly smaller and the residual sorting effects slightly larger.
A more aggressive approach is to drop any worker classified in more than one
(binary) race group in RAIS, which reduces our sample sizes by about 37%, with
a relatively larger loss of nonwhites than whites.49 Importantly, it removes an even
47All the values displayed in those figures are reported in Tables D10 and D11 in the Appendix.
48As mentioned earlier, the estimated effects based on this sample for the establishments located
in the Southeast are very close to those obtained using observations for the Southeast region only.
49The percentage of person-year observations lost when imposing this restriction is 31% for white
males, 48% for non-white males, 24% for white females, and 44% for non-white females.
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larger share of between-establishment movers, since nearly all changes in race occur
with a change in employer. The average wage gaps in this “consistent race" sample
are about 10 ppts. larger than in our baseline sample, reflecting a slight increase in the
mean wage of nonwhites and a larger rise in the mean wage of whites. Nevertheless,
the decomposition shares are not too different from those in our baseline results.
Most notably, the share of the wage gap attributed to the pay-setting effect is larger
with this sample, rising to 9% and 7% of the overall wage gap – vs. 5% and 6% in
our baseline results – for men and women, respectively.
In discussing the fit of our two-way fixed effects models, we noted that the models
tend to underestimate wages of workers with low estimated person effects who are
employed at establishments with low wage premiums. To evaluate the sensitivity
of our results to these observations, we took our baseline samples and excluded
observations for workers with estimated person effects in the bottom decile of the
person effect distribution, as well as for workers at establishments in the bottom decile
of the estimated wage premium distribution. We then repeated our decompositions
finding that these exclusions have only negligible effects on our baseline results.
Next, we show the impact of attributing 50% or 100% of the racial wage gap in the
restaurant sector to higher premiums earned by whites, rather than to a difference in
productivity, as in our baseline normalization. As mentioned above, this raises the
wage premiums for whites mechanically by 1.5 ppts. or 3 ppts., and the relative wage-
setting effects by the same amounts. In contrast, by construction, the sorting effect
remains identical. Its composition is affected, however, because these alternative
normalizations also lower the person effects of whites mechanically by 1.5 ppts. or 3
ppts. Yet, the impact on the skill distribution is limited, such that the reduction in
the share of the sorting effect attributed to skill-based sorting is minimal.
We also show the impact of using other sectors, in which firms have likely little or
no rent to share, for the normalization of the establishment effects. Specifically, we
assumed that wage premiums of both races were zero in two alternative sectors with
low average establishment pay premiums, namely the auto repair sector for males
and the clothing and apparel sector (i.e., firms that sew clothing) for females. These
choices have the advantage of sidestepping concerns that some restaurant customers
may prefer to be served by whites, possibly leading to differential wage premiums
in that sector. Importantly, the “unexplained” racial wage gap in those sectors is
nearly identical to the gap in the restaurant sector, so these choices lead to similar
normalizations and only neglibible changes relative to our baseline results.
Finally, we investigate how our results vary with possible variation in the incentive
of employers to engage in discriminatory employment or wage-setting policies. First,
as mentioned earlier, legal or social sanctions against discrimination in the Brazilian
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labor market may have evolved over time. To evaluate this possibility, we divided
our sample into two (overlapping) 8-year periods, from 2002 to 2009 and from 2007
to 2014.50 We then re-estimated our AKM models separately by sub-period and re-
peated our decompositions. Interestingly, we see a small decline in the overall racial
wage gap between the periods, with a reduction in the magnitudes of the residual
sorting and relative pay-setting effects, the two components that are most likely
to reflect discriminatory practices. Second, employers may have less incentives to
discriminate against nonwhites in industries where interactions between employees
and customers are less frequent. Accordingly, we see that the residual sorting and
relative pay-setting effects are larger in high “face-time” sectors (commerce, hospi-
tality, financial services and insurance, real estate) than in low “face-time” sectors
(extractive and transformation industries, utilities, construction).51
7 Conclusions
This paper measured the contribution of firms’ employment and wage-setting policies
to the white-nonwhite pay gap in Brazil. It showed that firms exacerbate racial
inequalities in general skills in three ways. First, the strong assortativeness in the
matching between workers and establishments means that nonwhites are less likely to
be employed in high-premium workplaces, even in the absence of any discriminatory
practices, an effect that accounts for about half of the contribution of firms to the
racial wage gap. Yet, non-white workers also tend to be sorted into lower-premium
establishments, and tend to receive lower pay premiums in the establishments that
they are sorted into, compared to white workers of similar skill levels. The associated
wage losses are particularly severe for nonwhites at the top of the skill distribution.
The results of this paper relate to active policy debates that are taking place
across Latin American countries, where racial differences in education levels are per-
sistent and nonwhites remain under-represented in high-paying industries and occu-
pations. Plaintiffs have used the disproportionately high share of white employees
in several industries as evidence of (potentially “unconscious”) discrimination, as in
the high profile case filed in 2009 by the Union of Bank Employees of Brasilia against
Itau Unibanco. In this case, Brazil’s highest labor court agreed that the disparities
were alarming, but ruled against the plaintiff as it found no direct evidence of irreg-
ularities in the hiring and promotion practices of the bank. Interestingly, we show
in Tables D14 and D15 in the Appendix that our estimates of the “unexplained”
50Tables D12 and D13 in the Appendix present the statistics in Table 4 for the two sub-periods.
51We simply implement our decompositions separately for the two groups of sectors.
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under-representation of nonwhites is largest in the “banking and finance” sector.
The findings of this paper naturally raise the question of how policies and man-
agement practices could help narrow the racial pay gap. The large white-nonwhite
skill gap, combined with the strong assortative matching, highlights the importance
of investments towards narrowing the educational gap. Yet, it is important to under-
line that the skill gap that we estimate is not necessarily determined prior to workers
entering the labor force. Differential mentoring and on-the-job training opportuni-
ties could also lower the skills that workers bring to any job, or even undermine the
impact of educational investments. An interesting agenda for future research is to go
beyond the “static” decomposition in this paper and examine the dynamic process
through which workers end up with higher person and firm effects.
In that respect, it would be interesting to study the impact of affirmative action
policies that exist in several countries. Despite the recent adoption of racial quotas
for public-sector jobs, Brazil does not require private-sector employers to take race
into account in their recruitment process. For instance, in contrast to the US, Brazil
does not require government contractors to make efforts to employ disadvantaged
groups at rates proportional to their shares in the (qualified) local labor market.
Miller (2017) shows that such policies can have powerful and lasting impacts on
the racial composition of “treated” firms. Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen what
the effects of similar policies would imply for the overall quality of the matching
of nonwhites in the labor market, and whether these effects would generalize to a
Latin American context. There is also a “softer” but increasing social pressure in
many countries on large companies to improve their standing on racial equality. For
instance, the Ethos Institute in cooperation with the Inter-American Development
Bank releases periodically the so-called Social, Racial, and Gender Profile of the 500
Largest Brazilian Companies , which analyzes the workforce of these companies to
reveal possible ethno-racial inequalities (among others) and reports on best employ-
ment practices and affirmative action programs already in place in those corporations.
It remains unclear, however, to which extent this growing movement actually affects
firms’ employment and wage-setting policies towards non-white workers.
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Figure 1: Log Hourly Wage Distributions Among Private-Sector Employees (Males)
(a) All education levels (Southeast)
 




(b) All education levels (Northeast)
 




(c) No high school (Southeast)
 




(d) No high school (Northeast)
 




(e) Completed high school (Southeast)
 




(f) Completed high school (Northeast)
 




Notes: The figure displays kernel densities (Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.025 half-width) of the log wage-
to-minimum-wage ratio for whites and nonwhites, based on PNAD 2002-2014 and constructed using survey
weights (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include male non-farm private-sector employees
(either formal or informal), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and
non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. The left and right panels restrict the
samples to the Southeast and the Northeast regions, respectively. The top panel pools all education levels
together; the middle and bottom panels are restricted to workers with no high school degree and with at
least a high school degree, respectively.




























































































































































































4	to	4	 4	to	3	 4	to	2	 4	to	1	 1	to	4	 1	to	3	 1	to	2	 1	to	1	
Notes: The figure displays the evolution of wages for workers in the Southeast region who moved from origin establishments in the top and bottom
quartile groups to destination establishments in any of the other quartile groups. We use the samples described in columns (1)-(4) in Table 4; the movers
are defined as workers at establishments employing at least one worker of each race-gender group, who separated from the origin establishment in 2003-
2012, were reemployed in the destination establishment the next or the following year, and were employed at the origin and destination establishments
for 2+ consecutive years. Origin/destination groups are based on quartiles of co-worker wages during the calendar year of separation/hiring.



























































































































































































1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	 12	 13	 14	 15	 16	 17	 18	 19	 20	
Origin	quantile	
Notes: The figure plots the mean change in movers’ wages between the years prior to separation and after hiring against the mean change in co-worker
wages between origin and destination establishments. Origin and destination establishments are grouped by 20 quantiles of co-worker wages; each of
the 20x20 dots corresponds to movers from/to given origin/destination quantiles. Movers are defined as in Figure 2; their wage changes are adjusted
for trends based on coefficients from a regression estimated on the sample of stayers, workers who remain at the same origin establishments over the
years around a move. The model includes the same education dummies as in Table 2 and a quadratic in age fully interacted with these dummies.
Figure 4: Evidence of Assortativeness in the Matching Between Workers and Establishments
(a) White males













































































































Notes: The figure displays the share of person-year observations across establishment effect quartiles by
education categories, which correspond to the same education dummies as in Table 2: incomplete elementary
school (IncElem), and complete elementary school (including those with incomplete middle school; IncMid),
middle school (including those with incomplete high school; IncHigh), high school (including those with
incomplete college; IncColl), or college (College). The samples are restricted to the largest connected set
for each race-gender group in the Southeast region, described in columns (5)-(8) in Table 4.



































































Notes: The figure displays the cumulative distribution of average white-specific establishment effects for
three-digit industry sectors (CNAE), after normalizing these with respect to the average in the restaurant
sector (all establishments effects are normalized in the same way in subsequent figures and tables). The
averages are computed over person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast
region, i.e., the set of establishments in the largest connected set for both whites and nonwhites of that gender,
which is described in columns (9)-(12) in Table 4. The rank correlation between these sector-level averages
for males and females is 0.93.




















































-1 -.5 0 .5 1
White-Specific Establishment Effects
Correlation: .535
Notes: The figure displays binned scatterplots of white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects
from the Southeast region’s dual connected set of each gender. Observations are unique establishments.
Scatterplots use 20 equal-sized bins and plot the within-bin means. The slope of the OLS fit line (with its
standard error in parentheses) is reported in the graph (the correlation coefficient of the variables are reported
under the graph), as well as an IV estimate that accounts for estimation errors in the white premiums by
using the premiums for white women as instruments for the premiums for white men (and vice versa; in
that case, we use establishments in the tetra-connected set, i.e., the intersection of the dual-connected sets
of both genders).
Figure 7: Skill-Based Assortative Matching by Establishment Effect Deciles
(a) Males (all education)
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Predicted distribution preserving establishment skill composition
Naive predicted distribution
(b) Females (all education)
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Predicted distribution preserving establishment skill composition
Naive predicted distribution
(c) Males (completed high school)
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Predicted distribution preserving establishment skill composition
Naive predicted distribution
(d) Females (completed high school)
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Predicted distribution preserving establishment skill composition
Naive predicted distribution
Notes: The figure displays the share of non-white person-year observations by deciles of the white-specific
establishment effects (residualized of micro-region fixed effects). The naive and predicted distributions
reshuﬄe person-year observations – regardless of race – across establishments within a micro-region. The
naive distribution maintains the age distribution of establishments for each year. The predicted distribution
maintains the age and skill distribution of establishments for each year. Samples are restricted to the dual-
connected set of each gender (and education) group in the Southeast region. Nonwhites are reweighted so
as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender).
Figure 8: Residual Sorting Effect by Person Effect Deciles
(a) Males (all education)
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(b) Females (all education)
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(c) Males (completed high school)
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(d) Females (completed high school)
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Notes: The figure displays the means of the estimated white-specific establishment effects at workplaces of
whites and non-white workers in each decile of the person effect distribution. The gap between the mean
white-specific establishment effects of the two groups represents the residual sorting effect for workers in that
decile of person effects. We use person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the
Southeast region (the person effect deciles are defined pooling whites and nonwhites together). Nonwhites
are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender).
Figure 9: Relative Wage-Setting Effect by Person Effect Deciles
(a) Males (all education)
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(b) Females (all education)
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(c) Males (completed high school)
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(d) Females (completed high school)
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5






















Notes: The figure displays the means of the estimated white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment
effects at workplaces of non-white workers in each decile of the person effect distribution. The gap between
the mean white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects represents the relative wage-setting effect
for workers in that decile of person effects. We use person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each
gender in the Southeast region (the person effect deciles are defined pooling whites and nonwhites together).
Nonwhites are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same
gender).
Figure 10: Robustness and Heterogeneity
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Skill-based sorting Residual sorting Relative wage-setting Person effect and covariates










Skill-based sorting Residual sorting Relative wage-setting Person effect and covariates










Skill-based sorting Residual sorting Relative wage-setting Person effect and covariates
Notes: The figure displays similar decomposition results as in Table 9 for a series of robustness checks and heterogeneity analyses (see text for details).
In each case, the height of the stacked column represents the mean white-nonwhite wage gap and its four components represent the gap attributed
to skill-based sorting, to residual sorting, to relative wage-setting, and to differences in person effects and covariates, respectively. For reference, the
first column in each panel reproduces our baseline results from Table 9. All samples are restricted to the dual-connected set of each gender (and
education) group. Nonwhites are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender).
All	 White
Mixed	
race Black All	 White
Mixed	
race Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males
	Share	of	sample	in	column	race	group 1.00 0.48 0.42 0.08 1.00 0.56 0.34 0.09
	Share	of	column	race	group 0.41 0.43 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.51
		in	private	employment
	Characteristics	of	private-sector	employees	in	column	race	group:
		Mean	years	of	education 8.44 9.24 7.59 7.76 8.90 9.60 7.99 8.00
		Fraction	with	high	school	or	more 0.45 0.53 0.37 0.38 0.49 0.56 0.40 0.39
		Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.61 1.78 1.42 1.46 1.75 1.89 1.57 1.55
		Share	with	wage	≤ 2	minimum	wages 0.54 0.44 0.66 0.66 0.46 0.38 0.56 0.59
		Share	in	formal	sector	employment 0.79 0.82 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.84 0.81 0.82
B.	Females
	Share	of	sample	in	column	race	group 1.00 0.51 0.41 0.08 1.00 0.59 0.32 0.08
	Share	of	column	race	group 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24
		in	private	employment
	Characteristics	of	private-sector	employees	in	column	race	group:
		Mean	years	of	education 10.15 10.66 9.41 9.39 10.36 10.94 9.39 9.28
		Fraction	with	high	school	or	more 0.65 0.69 0.58 0.59 0.67 0.72 0.57 0.57
		Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.48 1.62 1.28 1.31 1.58 1.70 1.38 1.37
		Share	with	wage	≤ 2	minimum	wages 0.71 0.63 0.82 0.82 0.66 0.58 0.78 0.80
		Share	in	formal	sector	employment 0.80 0.82 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.83
Brazil Southeast	region
Table	1:	Characteristics	of	Private-Sector	Employees	by	Race	Group
Notes: The table displays statistics based on PNAD 2002-2014 and constructed using survey weights (PNAD was not conducted in 2010).
The samples include males (panel A) and females (panel B), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and
non-missing data on race, gender, and education. Private employment status includes nonfarm formal and informal private-sector
employees, excluding those with missing wages or hours. Columns (1)-(4) present statistics for the whole country; columns (5)-(8)
restrict the sample to the Southeast region only. All monetary values in the paper are deflated using the CPI to a 2010 base. In each
case, the first column pools all race groups together; the other columns report statistics for each of the three main race groups,
separately	(the	race	groups	in	PNAD	are	white,	mixed	race,	black,	asian,	and	indigenous).											
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males
	Dummy	if	mixed	race -0.27 -0.11 -0.30 -0.16 -0.30 -0.11 -0.33 -0.16
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black -0.29 -0.13 -0.34 -0.19 -0.33 -0.14 -0.37 -0.21
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
	Education	and	experience no yes no yes no yes no yes
B.	Females
	Dummy	if	mixed	race -0.28 -0.11 -0.28 -0.13 -0.31 -0.11 -0.31 -0.13
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black -0.30 -0.11 -0.32 -0.16 -0.33 -0.11 -0.35 -0.16
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
	Education	and	experience no yes no yes no yes no yes
Table	2:	Racial	Differences	in	Log	Wages	in	PNAD	(Private-Sector	Employees)
Southeast	regionBrazil
Notes: The table displays the results of regressing log hourly wages on a series of race group dummies, using data from PNAD 2002-
2014 (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include male (panel A) and female (panel B) private-sector nonfarm
employees (either formal or informal), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and non-missing
data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. All specifications include year and state fixed effects and use survey
weights. Education and experience controls include five education dummies (incomplete elementary school, and complete
elementary school, middle school, high school, or college) and a quadratic in potential experience. The omitted race group is
white. Other race dummies not reported are indigenous and Asian. The samples in columns (1)-(4) use data for the whole country;










formal RAIS PNAD PNAD
PNAD-	
formal RAIS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males	-	All	education
	Dummy	if	nonwhite 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 -0.07
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Mean	for	whites 0.82 1.78 1.85 1.94 0.84 1.89 1.94 2.03
B.	Males	-	Completed	high	school
	Dummy	if	nonwhite 0.01 -0.16 -0.16 -0.11 0.01 -0.17 -0.16 -0.12
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Mean	for	whites 0.86 2.10 2.13 2.19 0.87 2.19 2.21 2.30
C.	Females	-	All	education
	Dummy	if	nonwhite -0.01 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Mean	for	whites 0.82 1.62 1.67 1.80 0.83 1.70 1.75 1.88
D.	Females	-	Completed	high	school
	Dummy	if	nonwhite -0.01 -0.14 -0.13 -0.11 0.00 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




Notes: The table displays the results of regressing the outcome on top of each column on a series of race group dummies, using data from
PNAD 2002-2014 (PNAD was not conducted in 2010) or RAIS 2002-2014. The samples include male (panels A and B) and female (panels C
and D) private-sector employees, age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, tenure of at least 1 month, and non-
missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. All specifications include year and state effects, the same education
dummies as in Table 2, and quadratic in potential experience (we use survey weights with the PNAD data). The omitted race category is
white; nonwhite includes both black and mixed race. Other race dummies not reported are indigenous and Asian. The samples in columns
(1)-(4) use data for the whole country; columns (5)-(8) restrict the samples to the Southeast region only. In each case, the first three columns
use the PNAD samples. The outcome in the first column is a dummy for being formally employed. The specification in the second column is
the same as in columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Table 2. The third column restricts the PNAD sample to formal employees. The specification in


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age
Mean	age 36.4 36.2 35.5 35.6 36.4 36.2 35.4 35.5 36.4 36.2 35.5 35.5
Share	≤	30	years	old	 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.33
Share	≥	50	years	old 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06
Education
Mean	years	of	schooling 9.4 8.5 10.7 9.7 9.5 8.5 10.7 9.7 9.5 8.5 10.8 9.7
Share	completed	high	school	 0.52 0.42 0.70 0.60 0.53 0.42 0.70 0.61 0.53 0.42 0.71 0.61
Share	completed	college 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.09
Wages	and	Hours
Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.96 1.77 1.80 1.56 1.98 1.79 1.82 1.57 2.03 1.80 1.88 1.59
(standard	dev.) (0.70) (0.60) (0.71) (0.56) (0.70) (0.60) (0.72) (0.57) (0.71) (0.60) (0.74) (0.57)
Mean	monthly	hours 188.1 188.4 184.2 185.2 188.0 188.3 183.9 184.8 187.8 188.3 182.7 184.6
Share	full-time 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97
Establishment	Characteristics
Mean	establishment	size 478 601 498 708 494 634 524 783 586 657 688 820
Share	females	at	establishment 0.24 0.22 0.65 0.64 0.24 0.22 0.64 0.64 0.24 0.22 0.63 0.63
Share	whites	at	establishment 0.80 0.50 0.82 0.50 0.80 0.51 0.82 0.52 0.77 0.52 0.78 0.53
Sample	Sizes
No.	person-year	obs. 43,960,676 18,442,544 31,072,137 10,214,292 42,504,499 17,464,447 29,467,955 9,213,854 35,700,872 16,858,515 22,181,982 8,795,728
No.	persons 9,066,023 4,064,366 6,943,395 2,547,634 8,643,741 3,783,424 6,443,519 2,224,382 7,677,443 3,717,140 5,258,580 2,169,911
No.	establishments 1,640,702 971,550 1,575,138 788,035 1,314,220 736,179 1,186,607 520,940 597,178 597,178 413,653 413,653
Table	4:	Descriptive	Statistics	Comparing	the	Analysis	Samples,	the	Largest	Connected	Sets,	and	the	Dual-Connected	Sets
Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics by race-gender group in three samples based on RAIS 2002-2014. The analysis samples in columns (1)-(4) include nonfarm private-sector formal employees in
the Southeast region, age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, tenure of at least 1 month, and non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked, who are
employed on December 31st of each year with an open-ended contract in which they are paid on a monthly basis. The entire history of an individual is dropped if that individual reports earning a wage below
the minimum wage or above the 99th percentile in a given year, as well as in the case of extreme wage changes between consecutive years. The analysis sample is restricted to the largest connected set for











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard	deviation	of	log	wages 0.705 0.598 0.716 0.571
Summary	of	Parameter	Estimates:
	Std.	dev.	of	person	effects	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.499 0.419 0.541 0.446
	Std.	dev.	of	estab.	effects	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.331 0.297 0.331 0.283
	Std.	dev.	of	Xb	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.178 0.182 0.185 0.187
	Correlation	of	person/estab.	effects 0.273 0.153 0.255 0.086
	RMSE	of	model 0.231 0.222 0.218 0.194
	Adjusted	R-squared	of	model 0.893 0.862 0.907 0.885
Comparison	job-match	effects	model:
	RMSE	of	match-effects	model 0.197 0.194 0.187 0.173
	Adjusted	R-squared	of	match-effects	model 0.922 0.895 0.932 0.909
	Variance	of	job	match	effect 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.009
	Percent	of	variance	of	wages	due	to	job	match	 3.4 4.0 2.7 2.7
Variance	decomposition:
	Percent	of	variance	of	log	wages	due	to:
		person	effects 50.1 49.1 57.0 61.0
		establishment	effects 22.1 24.8 21.3 24.6
		covariance	of	person	and	estab.	effects 18.2 10.7 17.7 6.7
		Xb	and	associated	covariances 1.5 5.2 -2.9 -0.3
		residual	(including	job	match	and	time-varying) 8.2 10.2 6.9 8.1
Notes: The table summarizes the results from estimating two-way fixed effects models for the log hourly
wage using person-year observations in the largest connected set for each race-gender group in the
Southeast region. The samples are described in columns (5)-(8) in Table 4. The models include dummies for
individual workers and individual establishments, year dummies interacted with the same five education
dummies as in Table 2, and quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with the education dummies. The











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Correlation	of	person/establishment	effects 0.273 0.153 0.255 0.086
Regression	coefficient	of	person	effect	on	establishment	effect:
	OLS	estimate 0.549 0.249 0.620 0.181
	OLS	estimate	including	micro-region	fixed	effects 0.521 0.214 0.598 0.154
	IV	estimate 0.672 0.523 0.746 0.638
	IV	estimate	including	micro-region	fixed	effects 0.660 0.520 0.756 0.678
Addendum:	first	stage	coefficients,	using	establishment	effect	for	opposite	race	(same	gender)	as	instrument
	First	stage	coefficient 0.763 0.812 0.706 0.737
	First	stage	coefficient	including	micro-region	fixed	effects 0.731 0.796 0.656 0.711
Notes: The table displays regression results providing evidence of attenuation bias in the correlation between the estimated
worker and establishment effects in our two-way fixed effects models. The samples are restricted to person-year
observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region, described in columns (9)-(12) in Table 4.  The
first row shows the unadjusted correlations of the worker and establishment effects, as in Table 5, but for the dual-
connected sets.  Next, we present OLS estimates from regressing the person effect on the establishment effect, and IV
estimates in which we use the establishment effect for the opposite race (but same gender) as instrument. The bottom rows
present the first stage regression coefficients. In each case, we show results from two models: one with no other controls
and one that controls for micro-region fixed effects (and therefore control for the availability of different subgroups of
workers	in	each	establishment's	local	labor	market).	
Table	6:	Evidence	of	Attentuation	Bias	in	Correlation	Between	Worker	and	Establishment	Effects
Overall	racial Person Covariate Establishment
wage	gap effects index effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)Est.	Effs
A.	Males
	Unadjusted	for	locational	differences:
All	education 0.227 0.160 -0.001 0.068
(0.70) (0.00) (0.30)
No	high	school 0.089 0.054 0.006 0.029
(0.61) (0.07) (0.33)
Completed	high	school 0.290 0.210 -0.006 0.086
(0.72) -(0.02) (0.30)
	Adjusted	for	locational	differences	(nonwhites	reweighted	to	white	distribution):
All	education 0.186 0.144 -0.003 0.044
(0.78) -(0.01) (0.24)
No	high	school 0.052 0.038 0.004 0.010
(0.73) (0.08) (0.19)




All	education 0.295 0.217 -0.022 0.100
(0.73) -(0.07) (0.34)
No	high	school 0.081 0.051 -0.009 0.039
(0.63) -(0.11) (0.48)
Completed	high	school 0.322 0.239 -0.027 0.110
(0.74) -(0.08) (0.34)
	Adjusted	for	locational	differences	(nonwhites	reweighted	to	white	distribution):
All	education 0.261 0.216 -0.026 0.071
(0.83) -(0.10) (0.27)
No	high	school 0.046 0.041 -0.013 0.018
(0.90) -(0.29) (0.40)




Notes: The table displays the results from implementing the decomposition of the average white-
nonwhite pay gap based on equation (4) using person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each
gender in the Southeast region, without and with reweighting so that nonwhites have the same
distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender). See text for a detailed explanation of the
decomposition. Entries in parentheses represent the percentage of the overall racial wage gap in the first
column	that	is	explained	by	the	factor	represented	in	the	column.
Overall	racial Gap	in	mean Relative Skill-based Residual
wage	gap Whites Nonwhites establishment	effect Sorting wage-setting sorting sorting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males
All	education 0.186 0.220 0.175 0.044 0.035 0.009 0.023 0.012
(0.24) (0.19) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06)
No	high	school 0.052 0.150 0.140 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.000
(0.19) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.01)
Completed	high	school 0.262 0.267 0.202 0.065 0.054 0.011 0.035 0.019
	 (0.25) (0.21) (0.04) (0.13) (0.07)
B.	Females
All	education 0.261 0.156 0.085 0.071 0.056 0.015 0.034 0.022
(0.27) (0.21) (0.06) (0.13) (0.09)
No	high	school 0.046 0.043 0.025 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.007
(0.40) (0.22) (0.17) (0.06) (0.16)
Completed	high	school 0.291 0.191 0.112 0.079 0.062 0.017 0.035 0.027






Notes: The table displays the results from implementing the decomposition of the average white-nonwhite gap in establishment effects into a relative wage setting effect and a
sorting effect based on equation (5), as we well as the decomposition of the sorting effect into a skill-based sorting and a residual sorting effect based on equations (7) and (8).
The samples include all person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region. Nonwhite observations are reweighted so that they have the
same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender). Column (1) reproduces the overall racial wage gap from column (1) of Table 7; column (2) and (3) report
the average establishment effect for white and nonwhites, respectively, and column (4) calculates the difference, which corresponds to the racial gap in mean establishment
effects in column (4) of Tables 7. Column (5) and (6) decompose the gap in column (4) into a sorting and relative wage-setting effect, respectively. Columns (7) and (8) decompose
the sorting effect into a skill-based and a residual sorting effect. Entries in parentheses represent the share of the overall racial wage gap (in column 1) that is explained by the
source	in	the	column	heading.	
Online Appendix
Appendix A: Data Construction
The raw RAIS data are provided in state-year files. The variable names, labels, types,
formats, and value labels are standardized across years. For each state-year file, we keep
workers employed on December 31st whose tenure is greater than one month to ensure
employment throughout December—the month at which wages are calculated. Workers
with invalid information for individual identifiers, establishment identifiers, and December
wages are dropped. Log hourly wages are constructed by taking the natural logarithm of the
real value of December wages (using Brazil’s CPI for that month) divided by the monthly
contracted hours (using weekly contracted hours multiplied by 4.348). When there is more
than one December job for a given person-year pair, we keep the observation with the highest
contracted hours. If tied in contracted hours, we keep the observation with the highest log
hourly wage. If tied in contracted hours and log hourly wages, we randomly selected one
observation. This ensures that person-year observations are unique within each state.
The selected unique person-year observations for each state are then stacked across 2002-
2014 into a single state file. Each establishment is assigned its modal legal classification,
municipality, and industry code. Each worker is assigned its modal gender, race, date of
birth, and education (we record the original value of the race variable for each observation
for our robustness checks).1 We then keep observations belonging to the private sector based
on the legal classification of each establishment (we remove observations with the Central
Bank industry code as well as those with invalid industry codes), and workers who are hired
on open-ended (i.e., not temporary) non-farm contracts and are paid on a monthly basis.
The remaining observations in each state file are then stacked across states into a single
master file. The entire employment history of an individual is removed when one of the fol-
lowing four conditions is satisfied. First, the worker has a repeated person-year observation
across states. Second, the nominal value of the reported December wage is below the federal
minimum wage for that month. Third, the log hourly wage is in the 99th percentile of the
wage distribution in the state. Fourth, the log hourly wage changes by more than 100 log
points in adjacent years. Based on these person-year observations, the modal assignments
from the previous paragraph are applied again, allowing us to categorize workers into mutu-
ally exclusive and exhaustive race-gender groups (the establishment size in Table 4 is based
1Date of birth is reported for 2002-2010 and age is reported for 2012-2014. We can thus calculate a
worker’s age for all years except 2011. We use 2010 and 2012 observations to calculate the age of 2011
observations; workers only observed in 2011 have a missing value for age, and are ultimately dropped from
our samples. These workers only appear in one year and would not help identify establishment effects.
1
on the count of workers per establishment in this sample).
Finally, the above sample is restricted to the desired race-gender group and region. The
education variable is used to calculate years of schooling. We calculate the years of potential
labor market experience as age − schooling − 6. The remaining person-year observations,
age 25 to 54 and with at least one year of potential labor market experience, constitute the
analysis samples described in columns 1-4 in Table 4.2
2Workers only observed in 2011 are dropped as their potential labor market experience is missing.
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Appendix B: A Simple Model of Monopsonistic Wage Setting
In this appendix we summarize implications of the monopsonistic wage setting model pro-
posed by Card et al. (2018). In the model, a large number of firms (or establishments)
compete over workers who have idiosyncratic tastes for different jobs. Building on standard
monopsony wage setting models, we assume that firms cannot negotiate individually with
workers, but instead post group-specific wages and are willing to hire any worker in a given
group who is willing to work at that wage.
Worker Preferences
There are J firms (or establishments) in a local labor market and two groups of workers
denoted by 1 and 2. Each firm j posts a pair of group-specific wages (w1j, w2j) that workers
costlessly observe. Assume that the indirect utility of a job at firm j for worker i in group
g ∈ {1, 2}, is:
uigj = δ
0
g ln(wgj − bg) + a0gj + vigj, (1)
where bg is a reference wage level (arising for example from the value of non-employment),
a0gj is a firm-specific amenity common to all workers in group g, vigj is a worker-specific
component of the value of a job at firm j, and δ0g > 0 is a factor expressing the relative
valuation of the excess wage offered by the firm versus its non-pecuniary amenities.
Assume that vigj = τgigj where igj is an EV-1 error that is independent across workers,
and τg is a scale factor reflecting the dispersion of idiosyncratic preferences within group g.
Under this assumption the fraction of workers in group g who would choose to work at firm
j is:
pgj ≡ P (uigj = argmax
k∈{1,..,J}
{uigk}) = exp(δg(ln(wgj − bg) + agj)∑J
k=1 exp(δg ln(wgk − bg) + agk)
, (2)
where δg = δ0g/τg and agj = a0gj/τg. Note that the differences between groups in δg reflect
both differences in the relative valuation placed on the excess wage versus the nonwwage
amenity, and differences in the dispersion of idiosyncratic values for different firms.
To abstract from strategic interactions in wage-setting, assume that the number of firms
J is large, in which case the logit probabilities in equation 2 are closely approximated by
exponential probabilities:
pgj ≈ Dg exp(δg ln(wgj − bg) + agj),
where Dg is a group-specific constant common to all firms in the market. In this case, the
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firm-specific supplies of workers in the two groups, N1j and N2j, are:
lnN1j(w1j) = d1 + δ1 ln(w1j − b1) + a1j (3)
lnN2j(w2j) = d2 + δ2 ln(w2j − b2) + a2j, (4)
where d1 and d2 are market specific constants.
Firm Optimization
Firms have production functions of the form:
Yj = Tjf(N1j, N2j), (5)
where Tj is a firm-specific productivity shifter. The firm’s problem is to post a pair of
group-specific wages that minimize the cost of labor services given knowledge of the supply
functions (3) and (4). These choices solve the cost-minimization problem:
min
w1j ,w2j
w1jN1j(w1j) + w2jN2j(w2j) s.t. Tjf(N1j(w1j), N2j(w2j)) ≥ Y.









where e1j and e2j represent the elasticities of supply of group 1 and 2 workers at the optimal
choice of wages, and µj represents the marginal cost of production, which the firm will equate
to marginal revenue at an optimal choice for Y . Thus the terms Tjf1µj and Tjf2µj on the
right hand sides of equations (6) and (7) represent the marginal revenue products of the two
types of labor. These equations express the traditional “markdown” condition that the firm
sets the wage for a given group equal to a fraction of its marginal revenue product, where
the fraction is just egj/(1+ egj). If, for example the elasticity of supply is around 5 then the
wage is about 15% less than marginal revenue product.






w2j − b2 .
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Note that when bg = 0 the firm’s labor supply elasticity for group g is just egj = δg, which
is constant across firms and independent of the wage. Otherwise, when bg > 0, the elasticity
becomes large as Ngj → 0, and falls in magnitude as Ngj becomes larger.















The optimal wage choice for group g is a weighted average of the reference wage bg and the
group’s marginal revenue product.
A Simple Benchmark: Linear Production and Fixed Output Price
To proceed we need to specify the production function and the firm’s marginal revenue
function. To keep things as simple as possible, we assume a linear technology – so the two
groups are perfect substitutes in production – and we assume that the firm is a price-taker
in its output market. Specifically, suppose that
f(N1j, N2j) = Nj ≡ θ1N1j + θ2N2j
where θg gives the efficiency units of each worker in group g and Nj represents the total
efficiency units of labor at firm j. Suppose in addition that the firm’s output price is P 0j .



















To understand the implications of this model for the wage structure, suppose that the
reference wages of the two groups are proportional to their relative productivities, so that
b1 = θ1b, b2 = θ2b.
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+ ln(1 + δ2Rj) (11)




gives the ratio of the marginal revenue product of labor at firm j to the
reference wage. Wages of both groups contain a firm-specific component that depends on Rj
and the group-specific supply parameter δg. To interpret these expressions, note that value
added per standardized unit of labor is λj ≡ P 0j Yj/N j = P 0j Tj, so Rj = λj/b is the ratio of
value added per standardized unit of labor to reference wage for a worker with 1 efficiency
unit of labor.
An important implication of these expressions is that for firms with Rj ≈ 1 – i.e.,
“marginally efficient” firms whose value added per worker is approximately equal to the
outside option available to workers – the wage of each group is approximately equal to its
marginal productivity:
lnw1j ≈ ln(θ1TjP 0j )
lnw2j ≈ ln(θ2TjP 0j )
These “marginal” firms have essentially no market power (since the elasticity of labor supply
tends to infinity as the wage falls to the reference wage level), so their offered wages reveal
the productivities of the two groups.
Implications for AKM-Style Wage Models
To illustrate the implications of equations 10 and 11, suppose that δgRj is relatively small.
In this case:
lnw1j ≈ ln (1− θ)b
1 + δ1
+ δ1Rj
lnw2j ≈ ln θb
1 + δ2
+ δ2Rj.
These equations imply that the wages of workers at different firms can be written in the
form:




where ψgj = δgRj is a group-specific firm component of wages. Note that groups with a
higher relative valuation of wages versus non-wage amenities (i.e., larger values of δ0g) and
groups with less dispersion in the firm-specific valuations of individual workers (i.e., smaller
values of τg) would be expected to have higher values of δg. These groups will have “larger
steps” in the job ladder across firms.
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Rio de Janeiro12.5 MSao Paulo21.1 M
Brasilia3.6 M
Notes: The figure displays a map of Brazil; the black lines correspond to the borders of Brazil’s five regions
(North, Northeast, Southeast, South, and Midwest; a region’s population according to the 2010 census is
reported under its name); the white lines correspond to the borders of Brazil’s 557 micro-regions; and blue
lines identify Brazil’s two largest cities (Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) and capital (Brasilia). The coloring
provides information on the share of nonwhites in a micro-region’s population according to the 2010 census.
Figure C2: Log Hourly Wage Distributions Among Private-Sector Employees (Females)
(a) All education levels (Southeast)
 




(b) All education levels (Northeast)
 




(c) No high school (Southeast)
 




(d) No high school (Northeast)
 




(e) Completed high school (Southeast)
 




(f) Completed high school (Northeast)
 




Notes: The figure displays kernel densities (Epanechnikov kernel with a 0.025 half-width) of the log wage-
to-minimum-wage ratio for whites and nonwhites, based on PNAD 2002-2014 and constructed using survey
weights (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include female non-farm private-sector employees
(either formal or informal), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and
non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. The left and right panels restrict the
samples to the Southeast and the Northeast regions, respectively. The top panel pools all education levels
together; the middle and bottom panels are restricted to workers with no high school degree and with at
least a high school degree, respectively.
Figure C3: Age-Wage Profiles by Cohort
(a) White males



















































































































Notes: The figure displays the age-wage profile by cohort, separately for each race-gender group. Specifically,
each panel shows the residuals of a regression of mean log wages by age and cohort on year fixed effects;
the lines correspond to age-wage profiles for different cohorts. The mean log wages by age and cohort
are constructed from the person-year observations in the largest connected set of each race-gender group,
described in columns (5)-(8) in Table 4. The age-wage profiles tend to peak around age 40 for white and
non-white males and around age 35 for white and non-white females.
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Establishment Effects (Brazil AKM)
Correlation: .991
Notes: The figure displays binned scatterplots of establishment effects from AKM models estimated on the
dual connected set of each race-gender group in the Southeast region versus in all of Brazil. Observations are
unique establishments that appear in both the Southeast and Brazil samples. Scatterplots use 20 equal-sized
bins and plot the within-bin means. The slope of the OLS fit line with its standard error (in parentheses)
are reported in each graph, as well as the correlation coefficient of the variables (under each graph).















































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Establishment Effect Decile
Notes: The figure displays mean residuals from AKM models estimated on the largest connected set of
each race-gender group in the Southeast region, for 100 cells defined by deciles of estimated establishment
effects interacted with deciles of estimated person effects. The mean residuals in each cell are close to zero,
with the exception of cells representing workers with low person effects employed at workplaces with low
establishment effects, where the mean residuals are systematically positive. This pattern is most pronounced
for non-white females, and is consistent with upward pressure from the minimum wage that is particularly
important for low-skilled workers employed at low-paying establishments. We evaluate the sensitivity of our
results to these observations in Section 6.
Figure C6: Shares of Jobs in High-Premium Establishments and of High-Skilled White
Workers Across Micro-Regions
(a) Males
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Notes: The figure displays scatterplots of the relationship between the share of jobs in high-premium estab-
lishments and the share of high-skilled white workers across micro-regions, based on person-year observations
in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region. Each dot corresponds to a micro-region.
The value on the x-axis is the share of person-year observations in establishments found in the top two deciles
of the white-specific establishment effect distribution. The value on the y-axis is the share of whites found
in the top two deciles of the person effect distribution (deciles are defined based on the full distribution
in the dual-connected set, thus pooling white and non-white workers). The positive relationship implies
that micro-regions with relatively more jobs in high-premium establishments have a relatively more skilled
population of white workers.
Figure C7: Distribution of Estimated Person Effects for White and Non-White Workers
(a) Males (all education)




(b) Females (all education)




(c) Males (no high school)




(d) Females (no high school)




(e) Males (high school)




(f) Females (high school)




Notes: The figure displays kernel densities (normal kernel with optimal bandwidth) of the estimated person
effects, using person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender (and education) group in
the Southeast region. Nonwhites are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as
whites (of the same gender).
Figure C8: Residual Sorting Effect by Person Effect Deciles (Using Other Gender)
(a) Males (all education)
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(b) Females (all education)
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(c) Males (completed high school)
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5



































(d) Females (completed high school)
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5



































Notes: The figure is constructed similarly as Figure 8, but uses the establishment effects of the other gender
to show that the main patterns in Figure 8 are robust to the sampling error issue discussed in the text.
The figure displays the means of the estimated white-specific establishment effects for the other gender
at workplaces of whites and non-white workers in each decile of the person effect distribution. The gap
between the mean white-specific establishment effects of the two groups represents a residual sorting effect
for workers in that decile of person effects, evaluated using the estimated firm effects for the other gender
of the same race group. We use person-year observations in the tetra-connected set (the intersection of the
dual-connected sets of both genders) in the Southeast region (the person effect deciles are defined pooling
whites and nonwhites together). Nonwhites are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-
regions as whites (of the same gender). The dip from the first to the second decile, which was more severe for
white workers in Figure 8, is no much smaller and similar between the race groups because there is no more
sampling error issue at the bottom of the skill distribution (the small remaining dip for women is likely due
to the upward pressure on wages from the minimum wage). As in Figure 8, in contrast, there is still a strong
tendency for higher-skilled workers to work at establishments with higher pay premiums. There is also still a
clear divergence between the mean establishment effects for whites and nonwhites, implying that nonwhites
are systematically under-represented at the best-paying workplaces, even conditional on their ability. In this
case, however, there is no more sampling error issue at the top of the skill distribution.
Figure C9: Relative Wage-Setting Effect by Person Effect Deciles (Other Gender)
(a) Males (all education)
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(b) Females (all education)
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(c) Males (completed high school)
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(d) Females (completed high school)
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5





























Notes: The figure is constructed similarly as Figure 9, but uses the establishment effects of the other gender
to show that the main patterns in Figure 9 are robust to the sampling error issue discussed in the text. The
figure displays the means of the estimated white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects for the
other gender at workplaces of non-white workers in each decile of the person effect distribution. The gap
between the mean white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects represents a relative wage-setting
effect for workers in that decile of person effects, evaluated using the estimated firm effects for the other
gender of the same race group. We use person-year observations in the tetra-connected set (the intersection
of the dual-connected sets of both genders) in the Southeast region (the person effect deciles are defined
pooling whites and nonwhites together). Nonwhites are reweighted so as to have the same distribution
across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender). The dip from the first to the second decile, which
was more severe for the nonwhite-specific establishment effect in Figure 9, is no much smaller and similar
for the mean white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects because there is no more sampling
error issue at the bottom of the skill distribution (the small remaining dip for women is likely due to the
upward pressure on wages from the minimum wage). As in Figure 9, in contrast, the gap between the mean
white-specific and nonwhite-specific establishment effects at the workplaces of nonwhites also widens across
the deciles. In this case, however, there is no more sampling error issue at the top of the skill distribution.
All	 White
Mixed	
race Black All	 White
Mixed	
race Black All	 White
Mixed	
race Black All	 White
Mixed	
race Black
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
A.	Males
Share	of	sample	in	column	race	group 1.00 0.23 0.69 0.08 1.00 0.27 0.62 0.10 1.00 0.78 0.17 0.04 1.00 0.41 0.51 0.08
Share	of	column	race	group	in	private	employment 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.37 0.44 0.43 0.47 0.52 0.39 0.37 0.40 0.44
Characteristics	of	priv.	employees	in	column	race	group:
		Mean	years	of	education 7.79 8.60 7.58 7.27 7.43 8.29 7.03 7.48 8.58 8.92 7.41 7.65 8.14 9.01 7.62 7.43
		Fraction	with	high	school	or	more 0.40 0.48 0.38 0.35 0.38 0.47 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.32 0.34 0.41 0.50 0.35 0.36
		Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.42 1.55 1.38 1.39 1.22 1.35 1.16 1.24 1.71 1.76 1.54 1.51 1.61 1.75 1.51 1.53
		Share	with	wage	≤ 2	minimum	wages 0.68 0.59 0.71 0.72 0.79 0.72 0.82 0.81 0.46 0.42 0.58 0.61 0.55 0.47 0.61 0.61
		Share	in	formal	sector	employment 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.77
B.	Females
Share	of	sample	in	column	race	group 1.00 0.25 0.68 0.06 1.00 0.29 0.61 0.09 1.00 0.80 0.15 0.04 1.00 0.43 0.49 0.07
Share	of	column	race	group	in	private	employment 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.21
Characteristics	of	priv.	employees	in	column	race	group:
		Mean	years	of	education 9.95 10.65 9.68 9.27 10.01 10.69 9.60 9.98 9.73 10.00 8.37 8.67 10.14 10.86 9.51 9.53
		Fraction	with	high	school	or	more 0.67 0.73 0.64 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.63 0.69 0.58 0.61 0.44 0.47 0.64 0.71 0.58 0.59
		Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.33 1.47 1.27 1.27 1.17 1.31 1.09 1.16 1.51 1.55 1.33 1.32 1.48 1.62 1.35 1.36
		Share	with	wage	≤ 2	minimum	wages 0.80 0.71 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.77 0.88 0.89 0.70 0.67 0.84 0.84 0.72 0.63 0.79 0.82
		Share	in	formal	sector	employment 0.70 0.75 0.68 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.67 0.71 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.81
Table	D1:	Characteristics	of	Private-Sector	Employees	by	Race	Group	(Other	Regions)
Notes: The table displays statistics based on PNAD 2002-2014 and constructed using survey weights (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include males (panel A) and females (panel B), age 25 to
54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and non-missing data on race, gender, and education. Private employment status includes formal and informal employees, but excludes those
with missing wages or hours. Columns (1)-(4), (5)-(8), (9)-(12), and (13)-(16) restrict the sample to the North region, the Northeast region, the South region, and the Midwest region, respectively. In each
case,	the	first	column	pool	all	race	groups	together;	the	other	columns	report	statistics	for	each	of	the	three	main	race	groups	(the	race	groups	in	PNAD	are	white,	mixed	race,	black,	asian,	and	indigenous).		
North	region Northeast	region South	region Midwest	region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
A.	Males
	Dummy	if	mixed	race -0.18 -0.09 -0.20 -0.12 -0.21 -0.08 -0.25 -0.14 -0.26 -0.11 -0.27 -0.16 -0.26 -0.12 -0.28 -0.16
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black -0.18 -0.08 -0.19 -0.12 -0.21 -0.09 -0.29 -0.16 -0.25 -0.13 -0.29 -0.17 -0.28 -0.12 -0.33 -0.19
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
	Education	and	experience no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
B.	Females
	Dummy	if	mixed	race -0.21 -0.09 -0.21 -0.11 -0.24 -0.10 -0.23 -0.12 -0.26 -0.09 -0.27 -0.14 -0.29 -0.12 -0.29 -0.15
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black -0.21 -0.07 -0.18 -0.08 -0.25 -0.11 -0.28 -0.15 -0.24 -0.11 -0.27 -0.14 -0.32 -0.14 -0.32 -0.17
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes













Notes: The table displays the results of regressing the log(hourly wage) on a series of race group dummies, using data from PNAD 2002-2014 (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include male (panel A) and female (panel
B) private-sector employees (either formal or informal), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. All specifications include
year and state fixed effects and use survey weights. Education and experience controls include five education dummies (incomplete elementary school, and complete elementary school, middle school, high school or college) and a






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males
	Dummy	if	mixed	race 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
	Education	and	experience no yes no yes no yes no yes
B.	Females
	Dummy	if	mixed	race 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Dummy	if	black 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
	Year	and	state	fixed	effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
	Education	and	experience no yes no yes no yes no yes
Table	D3:	Racial	Differences	in	Log	Work	Hours	in	PNAD	(Formal	Private-Sector	Employees)
Southeast	regionBrazil
Notes: The table displays the results of regressing log monthly work hours on a series of race group dummies, using data from
PNAD 2002-2014 (PNAD was not conducted in 2010). The samples include male (panel A) and female (panel B) private-sector non-
farm employees (formal employees only), age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, and non-missing
data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. All specifications include year and state fixed effects and use survey
weights. Education and experience controls include five education dummies (incomplete elementary school, and complete
elementary school, middle school, high school, or college) and a quadratic in potential experience. The omitted race group is
white. Other race dummies not reported are indigenous and Asian. The samples in columns (1)-(4) use data for the whole country;

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A.	Males	-	All	education
Dummy	if	nonwhite 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.01 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.12 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 -0.11
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean	for	whites 0.71 1.56 1.67 0.70 1.36 1.50 0.85 1.76 1.80 0.77 1.75 1.80
B.	Males	-	Completed	high	school
Dummy	if	nonwhite 0.01 -0.12 -0.12 0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.00 -0.17 -0.16 0.02 -0.17 -0.16
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean	for	whites 0.80 1.85 1.91 0.80 1.73 1.78 0.88 2.06 2.07 0.82 2.08 2.09
C.	Females	-	All	education
Dummy	if	nonwhite -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.10 -0.10 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 0.00 -0.12 -0.12
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean	for	whites 0.75 1.47 1.56 0.72 1.32 1.46 0.86 1.55 1.58 0.79 1.62 1.66
D.	Females	-	Completed	high	school
Dummy	if	nonwhite -0.03 -0.11 -0.10 -0.02 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14 -0.14 0.01 -0.16 -0.15
		(std	err.) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)




Notes: The table displays the results of regressing the outcome on top of each column on a series of race group dummies, using data from PNAD 2002-2014 (PNAD was not conducted
in 2010). The samples include male (panels A and B) and female (panels C and D) private-sector employees, age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year,
tenure of at least 1 month, and non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked. All specifications include year and state effects, the same education dummies
as in Table 2, and quadratic in potential experience (we use survey weights with the PNAD data). The omitted race category is white; nonwhite includes both black and mixed race.
Other race dummies not reported are indigenous and Asian. The samples in columns (1)-(3), (4)-(6), (7)-(9), and (10)-(12) use data for the North, Northeast, South and Midwest














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy	if	nonwhite -0.034 -0.120 -0.024 -0.071
Dummy	if	female -0.261 -0.326 -0.187 -0.302
Nonwhite	x	female -0.002 0.016 -0.004 -0.038
Notes: The table displays the results of regressing log hourly wages on a nonwhite dummy
fully interacted with a female dummy using data from PNAD 2002-2014 (PNAD was not
conducted in 2010) from the Southeast region as in Table 2 columns (5)-(8) and the pooled
RAIS dual-connected sets for males and females from the Southeast region shown in Table 4
columns (9)-(12). All specifications include year and state effects, the same education
dummies as in Table 2, and quadratic in potential experience (we use survey weights with
the PNAD data). The omitted race category is white; nonwhite includes both black and mixed












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard	deviation	of	log	wages 0.674 0.582 0.682 0.558
Summary	of	Parameter	Estimates:
	Std.	dev.	of	person	effects	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.473 0.400 0.514 0.437
	Std.	dev.	of	estab.	effects	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.328 0.297 0.323 0.283
	Std.	dev.	of	Xb	(across	person-yr	obs.) 0.185 0.191 0.194 0.197
	Correlation	of	person/estab.	effects 0.229 0.141 0.203 0.042
	RMSE	of	model 0.230 0.221 0.216 0.196
	Adjusted	R-squared	of	model 0.884 0.856 0.900 0.876
Comparison	job-match	effects	model:
	RMSE	of	match-effects	model 0.196 0.192 0.186 0.175
	Adjusted	R-squared	of	match-effects	model 0.916 0.891 0.926 0.902
	Variance	of	job	match	effect 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.009
	Percent	of	variance	of	wages	due	to	job	match	 3.7 4.4 2.8 2.9
Variance	decomposition:
	Percent	of	variance	of	log	wages	due	to:
		person	effects 49.3 47.1 56.9 61.3
		establishment	effects 23.6 26.1 22.4 25.8
		covariance	of	person	and	estab.	effects 15.6 9.9 14.5 3.3
		Xb	and	associated	covariances 2.7 6.2 -1.2 0.8
		residual	(including	job	match	and	time-varying) 8.9 10.7 7.4 8.7
Table	D6:	Summary	of	Estimated	Two-Way	Fixed	Effects	Models	by	Race-Gender	Group	(Brazil)
Notes: The table summarizes the results from estimating two-way fixed effects models for the log hourly wage using
person-year observations in the largest connected set for each race-gender group in Brazil as a whole. The models	
include dummies for individual workers and individual establishments, year dummies interacted with the same five
education dummies as in Table 2, and quadratic and cubic terms in age interacted with the education dummies. The



















Notes: The table reports Spearman's rank correlation coefficients of sector premiums (with
number of observations in parentheses and p-values in brackets). Krueger-Summers sector
premiums are the estimated wage differentials for three-digit census industries (CIC) reported
in Krueger and Summer (1988) Table A1. These estimates are obtained from a cross-section
regression of log wage on industry dummies with human capital and demographic controls on
the 1984 CPS. The average white-specific establishment effects by three-digit industry sectors
(CNAE) in RAIS are the same as those reported in Figure 5, i.e., computed over person-year
observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region. The CIC were
matched to CNAE using a cross-walk. Since this matching is not one-to-one we use an outer
join	that	creates	repeated	values	for	both	CIC-	and	CNAE-based	sector	premiums.	
Analysis	samples	(all	valid	observations)
Overall	racial Person Covariate Establishment
wage	gap Effects Index Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)Est.	Effs
A.	Males
	(i)	All	education
Wage	gap	 0.186 0.144 -0.003 0.044
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.118 0.088 0.000 0.029
Unexplained	component 0.069 0.056 -0.003 0.015
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.63) (0.61) -(0.05) (0.65)
	(ii)	No	high	school
Wage	gap	 0.052 0.038 0.004 0.010
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.012 0.007 0.004 0.001
Unexplained	component 0.039 0.030 0.001 0.009
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.24) (0.20) (0.88) (0.12)
	(iii)	Completed	high	school
Wage	gap	 0.262 0.203 -0.007 0.065
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.137 0.110 -0.002 0.029
Unexplained	component 0.124 0.093 -0.006 0.036
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.53) (0.54) (0.23) (0.45)
B.	Females
	(i)	All	education
Wage	gap	 0.261 0.216 -0.026 0.071
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.169 0.139 -0.008 0.039
Unexplained	component 0.091 0.077 -0.018 0.032
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.65) (0.64) (0.32) (0.55)
	(ii)	No	high	school
Wage	gap	 0.046 0.041 -0.013 0.018
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.001
Unexplained	component 0.037 0.034 -0.013 0.017
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.18) (0.16) -(0.02) (0.06)
	(iii)	Completed	high	school
Wage	gap	 0.291 0.243 -0.032 0.079
Explained	by	educ./exp. 0.163 0.140 -0.012 0.034
Unexplained	component 0.128 0.103 -0.020 0.045
	(Share	explained	by	educ./exp.) (0.56) (0.58) (0.37) (0.43)
Component	attributable	to:
Table	D8:	Relating	Decomposition	Results	to	 Standard	Mincerian	Model
Notes: The table displays the results from decomposing the overall racial wage gap in the dual-connected set of each
gender in the Southeast region, and the gaps attributed to each of the three components specified by equation (4),
into a part that is explained by education and experience and a part that remained unexplained. In each panel, the first
row reproduces the racial gaps reported in Table 7 (with reweighting). The third row is the component of the gap that
is not explained by education and experience ("unexplained component"). It is estimated by the coefficient on a white
dummy in a regression model for the log hourly wage (column 1), the person effect (column 2), the establishment
effect (column 3), or the covariate index (column 4) that controls for education and experience as in Table 3, and is
fitted by WLS to accomodate the reweighting adjustment (so that nonwhites have the same distribution across micro-
regions as whites of the same gender). The second row is the component of the gap that is explained by education and
experience, the difference between the overall gap and the unexplained component. The share of the overall gap that
is	explained	by	education	and	experience	is	reported	in	parenthesis.
Overall	racial Gap	in	mean Relative Skill-based Residual
wage	gap Whites Nonwhites establishment	effect Sorting wage-setting sorting sorting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.	Males
All	education 0.186 0.220 0.175 0.044 0.035 0.009 0.025 0.010
(0.24) (0.19) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05)
No	high	school 0.052 0.150 0.140 0.010 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.001
(0.19) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.01)
Completed	high	school 0.262 0.267 0.202 0.065 0.054 0.011 0.036 0.018
	 (0.25) (0.21) (0.04) (0.14) (0.07)
B.	Females
All	education 0.261 0.156 0.085 0.071 0.056 0.015 0.035 0.020
(0.27) (0.21) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08)
No	high	school 0.046 0.043 0.025 0.018 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.007
(0.40) (0.22) (0.17) (0.07) (0.15)
Completed	high	school 0.291 0.191 0.112 0.079 0.062 0.017 0.036 0.026







Notes: The table displays similar results as in Table 9 from implementing the decomposition of the average white-nonwhite gap in establishment effects into a relative wage setting
effect and a sorting effect based on equation (5), as we well as the decomposition of the sorting effect into a skill-based sorting and a residual sorting effect based on equations (7)
and (8). As in Table 9, the samples include all person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region. Nonwhite observations are reweighted so
that they have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same gender). Column (1) reproduces the overall racial wage gap from column (1) of Table 7; column (2)
and (3) report the average establishment effect for white and nonwhites, respectively, and column (4) calculates the difference, which corresponds to the racial gap in mean
establishment effects in column (4) of Tables 7. Column (5) and (6) decompose the gap in column (4) into a sorting and relative wage-setting effect, respectively. Columns (7) and (8)
decompose the sorting effect into a skill-based and a residual sorting effect. The only difference with Table 9 is that we use octiles instead of quartiles of the person effect

























Racial	wage	gap 0.186 0.154 0.077 0.196 0.279 0.189 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.205 0.195 0.217 0.192
Sorting 0.035 0.027 0.018 0.043 0.057 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.041 0.030 0.048 0.039
Skill-based	sorting 0.023 0.017 0.007 0.024 0.035 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.036 0.018
Residual	sorting 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.018 0.022 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.012 0.017 0.005 0.012 0.020
Relative	wage-setting 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.025 0.009 0.023 0.037 0.007 0.015 0.005 0.006 0.009
Human	capital	gap 0.142 0.118 0.056 0.148 0.198 0.143 0.128 0.114 0.144 0.149 0.160 0.163 0.144
Share	of	wage	gap
Sorting 0.190 0.177 0.230 0.217 0.204 0.193 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.199 0.152 0.221 0.201
Skill-based	sorting 0.126 0.113 0.084 0.124 0.124 0.124 0.116 0.105 0.127 0.118 0.124 0.165 0.095
Residual	sorting 0.065 0.063 0.146 0.093 0.080 0.069 0.075 0.085 0.064 0.081 0.028 0.056 0.107
Relative	wage-setting 0.048 0.061 0.051 0.031 0.088 0.047 0.123 0.199 0.039 0.071 0.028 0.027 0.049
Human	capital	gap 0.761 0.763 0.719 0.752 0.708 0.760 0.686 0.611 0.771 0.730 0.820 0.752 0.750
B.	Females
Racial	wage	gap 0.261 0.220 0.106 0.261 0.362 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.261 0.285 0.275 0.259 0.283
Sorting 0.056 0.046 0.022 0.058 0.080 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.061 0.050 0.059 0.074
Skill-based	sorting 0.034 0.027 0.009 0.033 0.049 0.034 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.047 0.043
Residual	sorting 0.022 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.031 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.022 0.029 0.019 0.012 0.031
Relative	wage-setting 0.015 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.025 0.015 0.029 0.043 0.016 0.023 0.010 0.005 0.019
Human	capital	gap 0.190 0.161 0.082 0.193 0.257 0.190 0.176 0.162 0.189 0.201 0.214 0.196 0.191
Share	of	wage	gap
Sorting 0.214 0.210 0.213 0.222 0.222 0.215 0.214 0.214 0.214 0.215 0.183 0.227 0.261
Skill-based	sorting 0.129 0.122 0.084 0.126 0.137 0.129 0.123 0.118 0.128 0.114 0.116 0.183 0.151
Residual	sorting 0.086 0.088 0.129 0.096 0.085 0.086 0.091 0.097 0.086 0.102 0.067 0.044 0.109
Relative	wage-setting 0.058 0.058 0.015 0.039 0.068 0.058 0.112 0.165 0.062 0.080 0.037 0.018 0.067
Human	capital	gap 0.728 0.732 0.773 0.739 0.710 0.727 0.674 0.620 0.724 0.705 0.779 0.755 0.673
Table	D10:	Robustness	of	Decompositions	to	Changes	in	Samples	and	Assumptions	(All	Education)






































Racial	wage	gap 0.262 0.220 0.115 0.271 0.348 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.287 0.262 0.271 0.271
Sorting 0.054 0.043 0.026 0.062 0.070 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.060 0.043 0.054 0.059
Skill-based	sorting 0.035 0.026 0.011 0.036 0.045 0.035 0.033 0.031 0.035 0.036 0.033 0.039 0.033
Residual	sorting 0.019 0.017 0.015 0.026 0.025 0.019 0.021 0.023 0.019 0.024 0.010 0.015 0.026
Relative	wage-setting 0.011 0.015 0.009 0.010 0.019 0.011 0.025 0.039 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.012
Human	capital	gap 0.196 0.162 0.081 0.199 0.259 0.197 0.182 0.168 0.198 0.215 0.212 0.209 0.199
Share	of	wage	gap
Sorting 0.206 0.197 0.223 0.228 0.202 0.207 0.206 0.206 0.206 0.208 0.165 0.198 0.218
Skill-based	sorting 0.133 0.120 0.093 0.132 0.129 0.133 0.126 0.118 0.134 0.126 0.127 0.144 0.122
Residual	sorting 0.073 0.078 0.129 0.096 0.073 0.074 0.081 0.088 0.072 0.083 0.037 0.054 0.096
Relative	wage-setting 0.044 0.066 0.075 0.037 0.054 0.043 0.097 0.151 0.037 0.045 0.026 0.031 0.046
Human	capital	gap 0.750 0.736 0.702 0.734 0.745 0.750 0.697 0.643 0.757 0.747 0.809 0.771 0.736
B.	Females
Racial	wage	gap 0.291 0.250 0.119 0.292 0.389 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.313 0.302 0.339 0.306
Sorting 0.062 0.053 0.029 0.064 0.082 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.067 0.053 0.076 0.078
Skill-based	sorting 0.035 0.028 0.011 0.035 0.048 0.035 0.033 0.032 0.035 0.032 0.033 0.056 0.043
Residual	sorting 0.027 0.024 0.018 0.029 0.034 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.027 0.034 0.020 0.020 0.035
Relative	wage-setting 0.017 0.015 0.002 0.011 0.026 0.017 0.031 0.045 0.019 0.025 0.012 0.009 0.019
Human	capital	gap 0.212 0.182 0.088 0.217 0.280 0.212 0.198 0.184 0.210 0.221 0.236 0.254 0.208
Share	of	wage	gap
Sorting 0.212 0.211 0.244 0.221 0.211 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.213 0.175 0.225 0.256
Skill-based	sorting 0.120 0.114 0.090 0.120 0.123 0.120 0.115 0.109 0.120 0.103 0.108 0.166 0.141
Residual	sorting 0.092 0.097 0.154 0.101 0.088 0.092 0.098 0.103 0.093 0.110 0.067 0.059 0.115
Relative	wage-setting 0.059 0.060 0.018 0.037 0.068 0.059 0.107 0.155 0.064 0.080 0.041 0.027 0.063
Human	capital	gap 0.729 0.730 0.738 0.743 0.721 0.729 0.681 0.633 0.724 0.707 0.783 0.748 0.681
Table	D11:	Robustness	of	Decompositions	to	Changes	in	Samples	and	Assumptions	(Completed	High	School)







































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age
Mean	age 36.1 35.9 35.2 35.4 36.1 35.9 35.1 35.3 36.1 35.9 35.2 35.4
Share	≤	30	years	old	 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.34 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.34
Share	≥	50	years	old 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06
Education
Mean	years	of	schooling 9.2 8.2 10.5 9.5 9.3 8.3 10.6 9.5 9.3 8.3 10.7 9.6
Share	completed	high	school	 0.49 0.37 0.67 0.55 0.50 0.38 0.68 0.57 0.51 0.39 0.69 0.57
Share	completed	college 0.10 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.23 0.10
Wages	and	Hours
Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 1.86 1.65 1.70 1.43 1.89 1.68 1.75 1.47 1.95 1.69 1.82 1.49
(standard	dev.) (0.71) (0.60) (0.73) (0.58) (0.71) (0.60) (0.74) (0.59) (0.73) (0.60) (0.76) (0.60)
Mean	monthly	hours 188.1 188.5 184.0 185.3 188.0 188.3 183.4 184.6 187.7 188.3 181.9 184.3
(standard	dev.) (11.90) (11.12) (19.23) (16.63) (11.94) (11.19) (19.68) (16.92) (12.14) (11.22) (20.23) (17.11)
Share	full-time 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.97
Establishment	Characteristics
Mean	establishment	size 422 514 421 573 454 578 473 718 577 608 703 764
Share	females	at	establishment 0.23 0.21 0.64 0.63 0.23 0.21 0.63 0.62 0.23 0.21 0.61 0.62
(leave-out	mean) 0.26 0.23 0.58 0.59 0.25 0.22 0.60 0.60 0.24 0.22 0.60 0.60
Share	whites	at	establishment 0.81 0.50 0.83 0.51 0.80 0.51 0.82 0.53 0.77 0.53 0.78 0.55
(leave-out	mean) 0.79 0.56 0.81 0.58 0.79 0.55 0.81 0.57 0.75 0.56 0.77 0.58
Sample	Sizes
No.	person-year	obs. 24,075,008 9,611,684 16,040,182 4,788,756 22,369,983 8,532,716 14,245,257 3,793,803 17,406,539 8,109,848 9,311,910 3,559,887
No.	persons 6,571,244 2,748,752 4,619,317 1,468,558 6,019,751 2,404,030 3,997,264 1,122,407 4,959,677 2,332,390 2,824,707 1,078,389
No.	establishments 1,134,130 645,649 1,046,157 480,913 774,065 392,415 630,365 225,672 304,838 304,838 170,989 170,989
Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics by race-gender group in three samples based on RAIS 2002-2009. The analysis samples in columns (1)-(4) include nonfarm private-sector formal employees in
the Southeast region, age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, tenure of at least 1 month, and non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked, who are
employed on December 31st of each year with an open-ended contract in which they are paid on a monthly basis. The entire history of an individual is dropped if that individual reports earning a wage below
the minimum wage or above the 99th percentile in a given year, as well as in the case of extreme wage changes between consecutive years. The analysis sample is restricted to the largest connected set for




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age
Mean	age 36.6 36.4 35.7 35.6 36.6 36.3 35.5 35.5 36.6 36.3 35.5 35.5
Share	≤	30	years	old	 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.33
Share	≥	50	years	old 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06
Education
Mean	years	of	schooling 9.6 8.7 10.8 9.8 9.6 8.7 10.8 9.9 9.7 8.7 10.9 9.9
Share	completed	high	school	 0.55 0.44 0.72 0.63 0.56 0.45 0.73 0.63 0.57 0.45 0.74 0.64
Share	completed	college 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.20 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.22 0.09
Wages	and	Hours
Mean	log	hourly	wage	(R$) 2.03 1.85 1.85 1.62 2.05 1.87 1.88 1.64 2.11 1.88 1.95 1.65
(standard	dev.) (0.68) (0.57) (0.69) (0.54) (0.69) (0.58) (0.70) (0.55) (0.70) (0.58) (0.72) (0.55)
Mean	monthly	hours 188.1 188.4 184.4 185.2 188.0 188.3 184.0 184.7 187.7 188.2 182.6 184.4
(standard	dev.) (11.36) (10.57) (17.87) (15.95) (11.38) (10.61) (18.18) (16.28) (11.57) (10.63) (19.01) (16.48)
Share	full-time 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97
Establishment	Characteristics
Mean	establishment	size 523 665 548 782 553 723 594 899 677 755 809 948
Share	females	at	establishment 0.25 0.23 0.65 0.65 0.25 0.23 0.64 0.64 0.25 0.23 0.63 0.63
(leave-out	mean) 0.28 0.25 0.60 0.61 0.27 0.24 0.61 0.61 0.26 0.24 0.61 0.62
Share	whites	at	establishment 0.79 0.50 0.81 0.50 0.79 0.51 0.81 0.51 0.75 0.52 0.77 0.53
(leave-out	mean) 0.77 0.55 0.79 0.57 0.77 0.54 0.79 0.55 0.74 0.55 0.75 0.56
Sample	Sizes
No.	person-year	obs. 30,187,495 13,112,908 22,154,540 7,662,857 28,514,275 12,056,128 20,416,320 6,648,507 23,184,341 11,542,387 14,785,049 6,299,182
No.	persons 7,847,841 3,589,664 6,078,282 2,288,125 7,320,848 3,257,489 5,495,282 1,933,699 6,293,717 3,179,095 4,301,305 1,873,283
No.	establishments 1,369,430 801,301 1,331,083 664,801 996,665 542,371 908,737 389,053 427,946 427,946 301,629 301,629
Notes: The table displays descriptive statistics by race-gender group in three samples based on RAIS 2007-2014. The analysis samples in columns (1)-(4) include nonfarm private-sector formal employees in
the Southeast region, age 25 to 54, with potential labor market experience of at least 1 year, tenure of at least 1 month, and non-missing data on race, gender, education, wage, and hours worked, who are
employed on December 31st of each year with an open-ended contract in which they are paid on a monthly basis. The entire history of an individual is dropped if that individual reports earning a wage below
the minimum wage or above the 99th percentile in a given year, as well as in the case of extreme wage changes between consecutive years. The analysis sample is restricted to the largest connected set for





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.	Males
Education 0.263 0.212 0.254 0.293 0.040 0.037
Banking	and	finance 0.161 0.697 0.166 0.251 0.085 0.021
Other	services	and	organizations 0.155 0.229 0.299 0.297 -0.002 0.028
Electricity/gas/utilities 0.137 0.582 0.216 0.246 0.030 0.043
Manufacturing 0.133 0.307 0.240 0.249 0.009 0.016
Farming	and	fishing 0.100 0.133 0.313 0.273 -0.041 0.010
Trade 0.093 0.105 0.296 0.310 0.014 0.015
Real	estate 0.085 0.190 0.335 0.322 -0.013 0.024
Construction 0.081 0.158 0.392 0.330 -0.062 0.015
Extractive	industries 0.072 0.391 0.378 0.382 0.003 0.008
Transportation	and	communication 0.064 0.208 0.307 0.307 0.000 0.020
Accomodation	and	food 0.056 0.015 0.304 0.353 0.049 0.001
B.	Females
Education 0.261 0.091 0.182 0.229 0.047 0.050
Farming	and	fishing 0.204 0.120 0.241 0.221 -0.019 0.049
Electricity/gas/utilities 0.189 0.461 0.148 0.198 0.050 0.056
Manufacturing 0.165 0.246 0.199 0.213 0.014 0.022
Other	services	and	organizations 0.161 0.167 0.238 0.227 -0.010 0.027
Banking	and	finance 0.156 0.575 0.146 0.202 0.056 0.041
Construction 0.154 0.201 0.264 0.248 -0.016 0.045
Transportation	and	communication 0.144 0.238 0.217 0.243 0.026 0.055
Real	estate 0.137 0.109 0.274 0.257 -0.016 0.043
Accomodation	and	food 0.128 0.016 0.305 0.289 -0.016 -0.001
Extractive	industries 0.115 0.501 0.282 0.293 0.011 0.044
Trade 0.095 0.108 0.288 0.280 -0.008 0.021
Notes: The table displays key decomposition statistics by broad sector of activities. Columns (1), (2), and (6) are analogous to those same columns in
Table 9 but for a specific sector. Column (3) is the average observed share of nonwhites in the sector, similar to the black line in Figure 7. Column
(4) is the average predicted share of nonwhites in the sector group preserving establishment skill composition, akin to the blue line in Figure 7. The
difference between the predicted and the observed shares shown in column (5) provides a measure of the under-representation of nonwhites in the



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.	Males
Education 0.263 0.190 0.220 0.255 0.035 0.034
Other	services	and	organizations 0.184 0.236 0.258 0.258 0.000 0.028
Manufacturing 0.173 0.375 0.204 0.212 0.008 0.019
Farming	and	fishing 0.163 0.207 0.240 0.222 -0.019 0.018
Banking	and	finance 0.158 0.667 0.161 0.224 0.063 0.016
Electricity/gas/utilities 0.145 0.559 0.203 0.212 0.008 0.038
Construction 0.137 0.179 0.333 0.284 -0.049 0.019
Trade 0.123 0.127 0.277 0.280 0.003 0.021
Real	estate 0.116 0.182 0.291 0.281 -0.010 0.028
Extractive	industries 0.095 0.540 0.391 0.387 -0.004 0.012
Accomodation	and	food 0.094 0.028 0.308 0.321 0.013 0.002
Transportation	and	communication 0.093 0.229 0.284 0.282 -0.002 0.020
B.	Females
Education 0.261 0.091 0.182 0.229 0.047 0.050
Farming	and	fishing 0.204 0.120 0.241 0.221 -0.019 0.049
Electricity/gas/utilities 0.189 0.461 0.148 0.198 0.050 0.056
Manufacturing 0.165 0.246 0.199 0.213 0.014 0.022
Other	services	and	organizations 0.161 0.167 0.238 0.227 -0.010 0.027
Banking	and	finance 0.156 0.575 0.146 0.202 0.056 0.041
Construction 0.154 0.201 0.264 0.248 -0.016 0.045
Transportation	and	communication 0.144 0.238 0.217 0.243 0.026 0.055
Real	estate 0.137 0.109 0.274 0.257 -0.016 0.043
Accomodation	and	food 0.128 0.016 0.305 0.289 -0.016 -0.001
Extractive	industries 0.115 0.501 0.282 0.293 0.011 0.044
Trade 0.095 0.108 0.288 0.280 -0.008 0.021
Notes: The table displays key decomposition statistics by broad sector of activities. Columns (1), (2), and (6) are analogous to those same columns in
Table 9 but for a specific sector. Column (3) is the average observed share of nonwhites in the sector, similar to the black line in Figure 7. Column
(4) is the average predicted share of nonwhites in the sector group preserving establishment skill composition, akin to the blue line in Figure 7. The
difference between the predicted and the observed shares shown in column (5) provides a measure of the under-representation of nonwhites in the
sector. The samples include all person-year observations in the dual-connected set of each gender in the Southeast region with at least a high school
education. Non-white observations in each sector are reweighted so as to have the same distribution across micro-regions as whites (of the same
gender)	in	the	same	sector.	
Table	D15:	Decomposition	Statistics	by	Sector	Group	(Completed	High	School)
